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Location Tracking by Police: The 
Regulation of ‘Tireless and Absolute 
Surveillance’ 
Bert-Jaap Koops,* Bryce Clayton Newell,** and Ivan Škorvánek*** 
Location information reveals people’s whereabouts, but can also tell 
much about their habits, preferences, and, ultimately, much of their 
private lives. Current surveillance technologies used in criminal 
investigation include many techniques to track someone’s movements; not 
all are equally intrusive. This raises the following questions: how do 
jurisdictions draw boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy 
intrusions? What factors play a role? How are geolocational privacy 
interests framed? In this Article, we answer these questions through a 
comparative analysis of location-tracking regulation in eight 
jurisdictions: Canada, Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
We analyze the legal status of location tracking through human 
observation, GPS tracking, cell-phone tracking, IMSI catchers 
(Stingrays), silent SMS, automated license-plate recognition, and 
directional Wi-Fi tracking in these countries. This results in highly 
context-dependent and case-specific assessments, in which eight factors 
play a role: use of a technical device, place, intensity, duration, degree of 
suspicion, object of tracking, covertness, and active generation of data. 
At a deeper level of analysis, we identify different conceptualizations of 
privacy underlying these assessments: not only classic privacy frames, such 
as communications secrecy, protection of home and body, and 
informational privacy, but also two new privacy frames: freedom of 
movement in combination with anonymity, and the mosaic theory. Thus, 
we discern a tentative but unmistakable shift in how lawmakers and 
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courts assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, particularly of 
people’s movements in public space. 
Traditional privacy frames tend to downplay the seriousness of the 
privacy infringement enabled by location tracking, and our analysis 
demonstrates an increasing discomfort with this tendency, leading to the 
emergence of novel privacy frames (or theories) to regulate what might 
easily turn into what the Supreme Court of the United States has called 
“tireless and absolute surveillance.” We conclude that legal privacy 
frameworks developed in past centuries prove ill-suited for assessing the 
privacy-intrusiveness of contemporary location-tracking investigation 
methods, and that emerging, novel frameworks for understanding and 
protecting privacy may provide lawmakers and courts with the tools 
needed to address the challenge of preserving (geolocational) privacy in 
the twenty-first century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the cell-phone era, one of the most common questions people ask each 
other is “Where are you?”1 In fact, people have always been interested in knowing 
where someone is or has been, and they have devised various strategies to find out, 
besides simply asking, “Where are you?” or “Where have you been?” For instance, 
the Mehinacu in Brazil can track people’s movements from telltale traces on the 
ground: “The paths are also sandy, and people know one another’s footprints, so 
that a person’s whereabouts are known even if he or she isn’t readily visible.”2 
Today’s footprints stretch widely beyond the sand: we leave digital footprints 
everywhere, including locational traces. Moreover, current surveillance technologies 
include a wide variety of techniques to track someone’s movements, including GPS 
trackers, IMSI catchers (Stingrays), automatic vehicle location (AVL), and 
automated license/number plate recognition (ALPR/ANPR). Additionally, new or 
more sophisticated methods continue to be developed, such as stealth SMS, 
directional Wi-Fi tracking,3 and wide-area surveillance arrays mounted on flying 
objects such as planes or helicopters.4 
 
1. MAURIZIO FERRARIS, WHERE ARE YOU? AN ONTOLOGY OF THE CELL PHONE 2 (Sarah 
De Sanctis trans., 2005) (arguing that the question “Where are you?” grasps the essence of the 
transformation induced by cell phones). 
2. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL 
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 12 (1975). 
3. See infra Sections II(B)–(E). 
4. Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-
surveillance/[https://web.archive.org/web/20190128162420/https:/www.bloomberg.com/features/
2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/]  (by using a wide-area array of surveillance cameras mounted on a 
plane flying over Baltimore, investigators “could backtrack to see where [a] vehicle had come from, 
marking all of the addresses it had visited. They also could fast-forward to see where the driver went 
after [committing a crime]”). 
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Obviously, such methods are highly relevant to criminal investigations. 
Indeed, location tracking by the police (or the acquisition and use of historical 
location data) has become a central question in a number of high-profile cases in 
recent years.5 In these cases, the question is reframed by investigators as something 
like, “Where were you at the time the crime was committed?” As suggested by that 
version of the question, location information can be vital for pinning down a 
suspect to a crime scene or providing them with an alibi. Indeed, real-time and 
historical geolocation data has become a common piece of evidence collected in 
criminal investigations. As one indication of the importance of locational records to 
police investigations, the United States Supreme Court has addressed geolocational 
tracking in a growing number of Fourth Amendment cases stretching back to the 
1980s. For example, in United States v. Knotts6 and United States v. Karo,7 the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether the warrantless use of 1980s tracking technologies 
(“beepers”) to track the movements of suspects’ automobiles amounted to 
unreasonable searches (the Court held they did not, in both cases, but for different 
reasons). In 2012, the Court decided that the warrantless installation of a GPS 
tracking device did violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, on the theory that 
the physical installation of the device amounted to an unlawful interference with the 
suspect’s property interests in the vehicle.8 Most recently, in Carpenter v. United 
States, the Court held that the police generally need a warrant to acquire a 
subscriber’s historical location records from a wireless carrier, as cell-phone users 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records of their movements 
generated by the use of their cellular phones.9  
Location tracking by police not only encompasses various technologies, it also 
features different forms and methods. For instance, police can track particular 
suspects, but also trace possible witnesses of a crime; they can follow the 
movements of persons, but also of objects, such as cell-phones or containers; and 
they can collect data about movements in the past, or track movements in real time. 
Some of these forms of tracking are highly intrusive. The creation of an ALPR 
database has been associated with the move towards a surveillance society and called 
“straight out of the Big Brother handbook,”10 while the use of tracking devices to 
dominate and control the location of others has been called a form of 
 
5. See e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones,  
565 U.S. 400 (2012). For earlier cases, see also, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
6. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276. 
7. Karo, 468 U.S. at 705. 
8. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
9. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206. 
10. Roger Clarke, The Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia, in THE 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF COVERT POLICING: THE FOURTH WORKSHOP ON THE SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 47, 57–58 (Simon Bronitt, Clive Harfield & Katina Michael 
eds., 2010). 
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“geoslavery.”11 The cell-phone metadata released by German politician Malte Spitz 
enabled the creation of not only a precise map of his movements over the prior six 
months, but also a clear picture of his habits and preferences: “it reveals an entire 
life.”12 
Yet not all forms and applications of location tracking are equally intrusive: 
putting a transponder on a package or container to determine where it will be 
delivered is less privacy-intrusive than tailing someone for a month; collecting cell-
site location information of peoples’ cell-phone movements is more privacy-
invasive than GPS tracking of their cars (since phones are usually used more often 
than cars and kept closer to the person). These differences raise questions about 
how intrusive location tracking is, or rather, on what basis we can and should assess 
the intrusiveness of the many forms of location tracking by police. This question is 
relevant not only because new forms of location tracking challenge lawmakers and 
courts, but also since they may not neatly fit into current legal frameworks. It is also 
relevant because a shift seems to be taking place with how the intrusiveness of 
location tracking is assessed, particularly where it concerns tracking people’s 
movements in public spaces. Traditionally, this is seen as only somewhat intrusive, 
since people voluntarily expose their movements in such places to third parties.13 
Increasingly, however, scholars (and, to some extent, lawmakers and courts), are 
recognizing that surveillance in public places can be highly intrusive as well. Thus, 
new normative frameworks, such as the mosaic theory, are being developed to 
assess location tracking’s intrusiveness without resorting to the age-old private 
space/public space distinction.14 
In this Article, we aim to identify how eight different jurisdictions assess and 
establish the privacy-invasiveness of location tracking and how they are drawing 
boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy intrusions. We analyze the 
factors that play a role in these assessments and how privacy interests in location 
information are being framed. To answer these questions, we conducted doctrinal 
legal analysis15 of the relevant law in eight jurisdictions (Canada, Czechia, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 
 
11. William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking 
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 I/S: J.L. POL’Y 409, 429 (2006) (arguing 
that imposing restrictions, control, and monitoring over another’s location constitutes a vestige and 
incident of slavery). 
12. Kai Biermann, Betrayed by Our Own Data, DIE ZEIT, (Mar. 10, 2011),  
http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz [https://perma.cc/ 
TAC4-8KZB]. 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
14. See, e.g., PRIVACY IN PUBLIC SPACE: CONCEPTUAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 
(Tjerk Timan, Bryce Clayton Newell & Bert-Jaap Koops eds., 2017) (featuring contributions that 
explore contemporary challenges to achieving privacy and anonymity in physical public space where 
legal protection remains limited compared to private spaces); see also infra Sections II(B)(2) and III(B)(3). 
15. Legal doctrinal analysis involves study of statutes and case law to analyze how and why an 
issue is regulated in a legal system. See Terry Hutchinson, Doctrinal Research, in RESEARCH METHODS 
IN LAW 7 (Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton eds., 2013). 
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compared our findings across jurisdictions.16 We selected these countries because 
while they have somewhat different cultures and histories and reflect both common-
law and civil-law traditions, they are sufficiently similar in terms of their legal 
systems and technological development to enable comparisons; thus, the selection 
offers a useful mix of differences and similarities. These similarities and differences 
offer interesting insights into how various legal traditions shape their privacy 
assessments in the context of criminal procedure.17 
The Article is structured as follows. We start in Section I with a broad 
overview of the relevant laws, broadly summarizing the legal status of location 
tracking across each of the eight jurisdictions. This may also serve as a quick 
reference section for the reader. In Section II, we discuss the legal status of location 
tracking in more detail, distinguishing between human observation, GPS tracking, 
cell-phone tracking, ALPR, and other forms of tracking. In Section III, we follow 
this description with an analysis and discussion of our primary findings. First, we 
analyze which factors lawmakers and courts in the studied jurisdictions use to assess 
the intrusiveness of location tracking; eight such factors turn out to be relevant: use 
of a technical device, place, intensity, duration, degree of suspicion, object of 
tracking, covertness, and active generation of data. Second, we analyze how privacy 
is framed—that is, which conceptualizations of privacy are applied in the context 
of location tracking? We identify not only classic privacy frames, such as 
communications secrecy, protection of the home, bodily integrity, and 
informational privacy, but also two new privacy frames being applied to address 
new criminal investigation methods, namely freedom of movement in combination 
with anonymity, and the mosaic theory. Finally, we conclude that legal privacy 
frameworks developed in past centuries prove ill-suited for assessing the privacy-
intrusiveness of contemporary location-tracking investigation methods, and that 
emerging, novel frameworks for understanding and protecting privacy may provide 
lawmakers and courts with the tools needed to address the challenge of preserving 




16. Throughout the text, we refer to these countries’ Code of Criminal Procedure as [country 
name’s] CPC, and to the Criminal Code as [country name’s] CC. For brevity’s sake, we use the term 
“warrant” as shorthand for the requisite authorization by a judge or court, although the exact type and 
term for court authorization may differ per country. All translations are ours (unless otherwise 
indicated). 
17. See Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 384, 389–98, 403–04, 408 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (discussing the importance of comparing jurisdictions which share 
both similarities and differences); see also Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan 
Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 505–
06 (2017) (further explaining the reasons for choosing these countries for comparative purposes). 
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I. BROAD OVERVIEW OF LAWS ON POLICE LOCATION TRACKING 
Since many of the particular technologies discussed below are covered by the 
same provisions in criminal procedure law, we first give a high-level overview of 
the most relevant legal provisions and cases in the jurisdictions studied (except 
where they specifically relate to a particular technology—those are discussed in 
Section II, infra). 
In Canada, warrantless location tracking by the police is governed by judicial 
interpretations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms18 and 
generally requires a special tracking warrant. There are very few cases examining the 
application of section 8 to location tracking by the police; in these, defendants were 
unsuccessful in arguing that the standards for obtaining tracking warrants are 
unconstitutional.19 Location tracking can be authorized, however, by tracking-
specific warrants outlined in section 492.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which 
stipulates conditions for obtaining a warrant for tracking devices targeted at 
transactions, things, or individuals.20 For purposes of a section 492.1 warrant, a 
tracking device is defined as “a device, including a computer program . . . that may 
be used to obtain or record tracking data or to transmit it by a means of 
telecommunication.”21 When such a warrant is granted, it allows a police officer “to 
install, activate, use, maintain, monitor and remove the tracking device, including 
covertly,”22 subject to any conditions imposed by the judge,23 but only for a 
maximum of 60 days from the date the warrant was issued.24 
In Czechia, police tracking is governed by Article 158d of the Czech Code of 
Criminal Procedure on observing persons and objects. Visual recordings of 
someone’s movements in public space25 or digital maps of the person’s movement 
created by, for instance, GPS tracking26 can only be created with a public 
prosecutor’s written approval. These approvals can be granted if there is concrete 
suspicion of criminal activity; sufficient justification of the necessity to create visual, 
audio, or other records; and a description of the persons or object to be observed.27 
The permit is issued for no longer than six months (but can be extended indefinitely 
every six months).28 
 
 
18. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). (“Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure”). 
19. See, e.g., R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 (Can.); R. v. Edwards, 2014 ONSC 6323 (Can.). 
20. For some discussion, see e.g., R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 (Can.). 
21. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(8) (Can.). 
22. Id. § 492.1(3). 
23. Id. § 492.1(4). 
24. Id. § 492.1(5). 
25. TRESTNÍ ŘÁD I, II, III, KOMENTÁŘ 1993 (P. Šámal ed., 2013). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 2008. 
28. Trestní řád, Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(4) (Czech). 
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In Germany, various provisions regulate tracking, depending on the 
modalities. In limited form—less than 24 hours, using only simple perception-
enhancing technology such as binoculars, and only outside of the home—tracking 
can be based on sections 161 and 163 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which regulate the general power of the public prosecutor and police to investigate 
crime without a warrant. For longer or more intrusive tracking, section 163f on 
“Long-Term Observation” can be used if the investigation concerns a crime of 
“substantial significance” and if other means of establishing the perpetrator’s 
location would offer much less prospect of success or would be much more 
difficult.29 This requires a warrant (Richtervorbehalt).30 Not only accused persons can 
be tracked: others can also be subjected to location tracking if a link between the 
perpetrator and the other person can be established and “the measure will lead 
to . . . determination of the perpetrator’s whereabouts” and “using other means 
would offer much less prospect of success or be much more difficult.”31 
Location tracking can also be conducted using existing police checks to search 
for the accused under section 163e of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.32 
To create a full movement pattern, this measure is aimed at establishing the 
accused’s travel pattern or route, means of transportation, carried goods, and 
companions.33 The measure is admissible against people who are not themselves 
suspects, but only if strong suspicion exists that the measure can lead to relevant 
findings related to the suspect and other measures would offer much less prospect 
of success.34 License plates can be included in the observation of cars registered to 
or in use with the accused.35 This type of tracking also requires a warrant and can 
be conducted for up to one year.36 Some other forms of tracking can be based on 
section 100h of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates “other 
measures outside of dwellings,” using technical devices for observation purposes 
other than visual or aural recording devices, such as RFID tracking,37 “stealth 
ping,”38 night-vision devices,39 or drones.40 To utilize these methods, there must be 
 
29. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f(1) (Ger.). 
30. Id. § 163f(3). 
31. Id. § 163f(1). 
32. Id. § 163e. 
33. URS KINDHÄUSER, STRAFPROZESSRECHT § 163e, Rn. 18–19 (4th ed. 2016). 
34. STPO § 163e(1). 
35. Id. § 163e(2). 
36. Id. § 163e(4). 
37. BJÖRN GERCKE ET AL., HEIDELBERGER KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 100h, Rn 4 (5th  
ed. 2012). 
38. SIGRID HEGMANN, BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR STPO § 100h, Rn. 6 (27th  
ed. 2017). 
39. RALF GÜNTHER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 100h, Rn. 6. (1st. ed. 2014). 
40. Tobias Singelnstein, Bildaufnahmen, Orten, Abhören – Entwicklungen und Streitfragen beim 
Einsatz technischer Mittel zur Strafverfolgung, NSTZ 2014 at 305, 308. 
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reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence of substantial significance,41 but no 
warrant is required. 
In Italy, there are no specific statutory provisions on location tracking, and 
the case law on tracking is largely limited to GPS tracking. In a consistent stream of 
case law, spearheaded by a judgment in 2002, the Italian Supreme Court found that 
GPS tracking can—just as human tailing albeit in this case technologically facilitated 
at a distance—be considered an ordinary activity of examination and ascertainment 
required from the police on the basis of Articles 55, 347, and 370 of the Italian 
Criminal Procedure Code.42 These Articles allow the police to conduct activities that 
do not substantially infringe fundamental rights or liberties, without further specific 
statutory rules or safeguards. Tailing and GPS tracking are considered activities that 
constitute at most a minor privacy interference (not infringing the constitutional 
right to secrecy of communications43), so that no judicial authorisation is required, 
not even—in contrast to a production order of traffic data—a motivated order 
from the public prosecutor.44 
In the Netherlands, location tracking currently generally falls under the 
power of “systematic observation” (stelselmatige observatie), which covers visual 
surveillance and other forms of sensory perception with or without technical 
devices, as long as no communications are recorded.45 Systematic observation is 
described as “systematically follow[ing] a person or systematically observ[ing]  
[a person’s] movements or behavior.”46 The police can observe suspects but also 
non-suspected persons, such as witnesses.47 Systematic observation requires an 
order from the public prosecutor but no warrant and can be conducted for any 
felony, so it is a low-threshold investigative power.48 The order can be given for  
a maximum period of three months but can be prolonged repeatedly  
 
41. STPO § 100h(1). 
42. Cass., sez. V, 27 febbraio 2002, n. 16130 (It.). See also, e.g., Cass., sez, I, 10 febbraio 2012,  
n. 14529 (It.), quoted in Teresa Bene, Il pedinamento elettronico: truismi e problemi spinosi, in LE 
INDAGINI ATIPICHE 347, 348 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., 2014). 
43. Art. 15 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
44. Cass., sez. V, 27 febbraio 2002, n. 16130 (It.); see also, e.g., Cass., sez, I, 10 febbraio 2012,  
n. 14529 (It.), quoted in Bene, supra note 42 at 348. 
45. Art. 126g(1) CPC (Neth.). 
46. Id. 
47. G.J.M. CORSTENS & M.J. BORGERS, HET NEDERLANDS STRAFPROCESRECHT 509 (8th  
ed. 2014). 
48. Art. 126g(1) CPC (Neth.); cf. Ybo Buruma, Stelselmatig, een sleutelbegrip in de Wet bijzondere 
opsporingsbevoegdheden, 25 NJCM-BULLETIN 649, 651 (2000) (wondering why systematic observation is 
considered a less intrusive power than, e.g., entering a shed in a meadow or covertly recording a 
conversation in a market-place). Note that in the proposed modernization of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, systematic observation will be allowed only for offenses carrying a maximum prison 
sentence of one year or more. For more information on this, see proposed art. 2.8.2.1.1 of the Concept 
Wetsvoorstel tot vaststelling van Boek 2 van het nieuwe Wetboek van Strafvordering: Het opsporingsonderzoek 
[draft Bill for book 2 of the new Criminal Procedure Code: Criminal Investigation, hereinafter Concept 
Wetsvoorstel Boek 2] , February 2017, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/
2017/02/07/wetsvoorstel-tot-vaststelling-van-boek-2-van-het-nieuwe-wetboek-van-strafvordering 
[https://perma.cc/A8X3-FEY7] (Neth.). 
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with three-month periods.49 To ensure reliability of the evidence, technical devices  
(e.g., binoculars, photo and video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal imagers,  
movement detection equipment, and tracking devices50) must comply with 
conditions of the Technical Devices Decree.51 
The proposed modernization of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with a draft 
bill published for consultation,52 includes a specific power for “systematic 
determination of location.” This would be an auxiliary power to enable executing 
one of the covert investigation powers, such as observation, infiltration, or oral 
interception; the conditions for systematic determination of location are therefore 
not sui generis but tied to those of another investigation power. The only limitation 
is that orders for systematic location-determination can be given for at most a 
month, which can be prolonged repeatedly with additional one-month periods.53 
In Poland, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not regulate covert 
surveillance powers, except for telecommunication interception. Observations are 
regulated instead by the Police Act in the context of operational-exploratory 
activities, which are extra-procedural police powers.54 Except for observations in 
non-public places, which are regulated more strictly,55 the powers of the police to 
observe and record anything that occurs in public places are almost unlimited under 
the Police Act. Article 15 allows the police to observe directly (with physical 
presence of the police officers) and at a distance (via technical means) any event 
occurring in public spaces,56 both openly and covertly.57 This is not limited to 
particular criminal offences and can be used in any operational matter, does not 
require approval of a prosecutor or court, and no time limits apply. The only 
limitation is that the surveillance must be conducted in a manner that minimizes the 
interference with the personal goods of the persons against whom it is undertaken.58 
In the United Kingdom, location tracking is covered by Part II of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), which extends to “monitoring, 
observing or listening to persons, their movements, conversations or other activities 
 
49. Art. 126g(4) CPC (Neth.). 
50. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, p. 71 (Neth.). 
51. Art. 126ee CPC (Neth.). See Decree on Technical Devices in Criminal Procedure (Besluit 
technische hulpmiddelen strafvordering) (Neth.). 
52. Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48. 
53. Id., proposed art. 2.8.2.10.1. 
54. Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police (Pol.). 
55. Art. 19 Police Act (Pol.) (regulating operational surveillance in non-public places). 
56. Art. 15(5a) Police Act (Pol.) (stipulating that police officers are allowed in the exercise of 
their service to “observe and, using technical means, register the image of events in public places, and 
in cases of operational-exploratory and administrative-order activities performed on statutory basis, also 
the sound associated with those events”). 
57. BARTOLOMIEJ OPALINSKI, MACIEJ ROGALSKI & PRZEMYSLAW SZUSTAKIEWICZ, 
USTAWA O POLICJI, KOMENTARZ 75–76 (2015). 
58. Art. 15(6) Police Act (Pol.). 
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and communications.”59 To engage in location tracking or other forms of 
surveillance, the police must obtain an “authorisation” whenever the intended 
surveillance is “directed” or “intrusive,” as defined by section 26 RIPA.60 
Authorisations, which typically last for three months, do not generally need to be 
judicially approved, as a designated official of a public body (e.g., an appointee 
within the police services) may execute authorisations; for most police forces, this 
will be the superintendent.61 The Code of Practice stipulates particular 
proportionality and subsidiarity requirements for granting authorisations.62 An 
authorisation for “directed surveillance” or “intrusive surveillance” under RIPA 
(Part II) provides a public authority with “a lawful basis . . . to carry out covert 
surveillance activity that is likely to result in the obtaining of private information 
about a person,”63 which includes various forms of location tracking. 
Finally, in the United States, location tracking is largely regulated through 
Fourth Amendment case law.64 Prior to Jones and Carpenter, the use of GPS devices 
was generally considered permissible without a warrant, as was tracking the location 
of certain objects through technical devices.65 In the landmark case of Jones, 
however, the Supreme Court determined that physically installing a GPS tracking 
unit on a suspect’s vehicle requires a warrant, as it constitutes an interference with 
the defendant’s property interest66 (and, according to the concurring opinions, 
because it violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy through the 
cumulative effect of prolonged instances of short-term surveillance).67 
Furthermore, in Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless acquisition 
of 127 days’ worth of cell site location information (CSLI) violated a person’s 
protected privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment and that a person 
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in such records regardless of 
 
59. HOME OFFICE, COVERT SURVEILLANCE AND PROPERTY INTERFERENCE: REVISED 
CODE OF PRACTICE 7 (Aug. 2018) (UK). 
60. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 c. 23 § 26(1)(a)–(b) (UK). 
61. The prescribed authorizing officer depends on the particular police force. See The 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) 
Order 2010, Schedule 1 (UK). 
62. HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at 27. 
63. Id. at 26. Private information is defined as “any information” that relates to the “private or 
family life” of any person. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2010 § 26(10) (UK). 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (“beeper” installed inside a can); United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (using a “beeper” in a chloroform container). 
66. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). Note that in many later cases where the GPS 
tracking had occurred prior to Jones, courts have applied the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary 
rule, admitting evidence since the officers had reasonably relied on existing legal precedent at the  
time they installed the tracking devices. See, e.g., United States v. Cabrera, 651 Fed. Appx. 118 (3rd  
Cir. 2016) (pre-Jones GPS tracking of vehicle fell within exclusionary rule’s good faith exception); United 
States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2015) (warrantless GPS tracking of vehicle was reasonable pre-
Jones). 
67. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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“[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or 
leverages the technology of a wireless carrier.”68 
To obtain a warrant for using a “tracking device” (defined broadly as  
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of 
a person or object”69), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 stipulates certain 
specific requirements, particularly relating to the period of installing a device (within 
10 days) and the period of execution (an extensible period of at most 45 days).70 
Also, Rule 41 (and Fourth Amendment case law) requires probable cause to obtain 
a tracking warrant.71 
II. TYPES OF TRACKING 
In this section, we discuss how lawmakers have regulated different forms of 
location tracking, with particular focus on the categories and criteria used to 
determine the level of privacy infringement. Due to scope limitations, we do not 
discuss all jurisdictions from our comparative study for each type of tracking; rather, 
we focus on the most illustrative examples. 
A. Human Observation 
The most classic form of location tracking is simply following a person while 
she moves around. Tailing someone usually happens covertly and is generally 
limited to public and publicly available places, since following someone into private 
spaces would often be noticeable by the followed person and thus thwart the 
purpose of tracking someone’s movement pattern. Since this form of tracking is 
physical and involves close proximity between the follower and the followed, 
tracking is closely related to visual observation; consequently, most jurisdictions 
regulate tracking in the same way as visual observation. 
Human observation is generally considered only a minor privacy intrusion, or 
sometimes even no intrusion, across the jurisdictions we studied. Poland provides 
the widest scope to the police, allowing human observation in publicly accessible 
places without approval of a prosecutor or court and without formal time limits72; 
also, use of perception-enhancing devices and even visual and aural recordings are 
allowed with no additional requirements compared to naked-eye observation.73 
Similarly, in Czechia, there are no time or approval restrictions on human 
observation by police.74 Although the law distinguishes observation using 
perception-enhancing tools that enable observation at a distance, such as 
 
68. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 at 2217 (2018). 
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2012). 
70. Id. § 3117(e)(2)(C). 
71. See, e.g., id. § 3117(d)(1). 
72. Police Act (Art. 15/1990) (Pol.). 
73. Id. Art. 15(5a). 
74. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(1) (Czech). 
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binoculars,75 from classical physical observation by police officers,76 there is legally 
no difference between the two forms. However, in contrast to Poland, Czech law 
requires written approval of the prosecutor if recordings are made of what is being 
observed.77 
U.K. law does not distinguish between naked-eye observation and recording, 
but it instead applies criteria of covertness and focus. Visual observation, whether 
accomplished by the unaided eye or through the use of video surveillance cameras, 
is subject to RIPA’s authorisation requirements only when it is covert78 and carried 
out as part of a specific investigation into a person or group of persons (i.e., 
“directed” surveillance).79 However, as in Poland, authorisation from a prosecutor 
or judge is not needed. Instead, approval can be obtained from a designated official 
of a public body, which can be an appointee within the police services, usually a 
superintendent.80 
Poland and Czechia apply stricter conditions when people are observed or 
followed in non-public places.81 The U.K. also applies stricter conditions for 
observation in residential premises, which is termed “intrusive surveillance,”82 
limiting it to cases where the surveillance is necessary for the purpose of preventing 
or detecting serious crime,83 and requiring permission by a higher authority 
(including a chief constable), although not a judicial one.84 
 
75. Šámal, supra note 25, at 2004. 
76. Id. at 2005. 
77. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(2) (Czech). 
78. As defined in Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(9)(a) (UK), 
surveillance is covert “if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons 
who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.” 
79. Exceptions to the authorization requirement apply in emergencies or other situations where 
obtaining an authorization is unpractical, among other situations. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at 
18–25. 
80. Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources) Order 2010, § 30 (UK). 
81. Police Act (Art. 19/1990) (Pol.) (requiring judicial authorization for observation and 
recording of people’s image in dwellings, means of transport and non-public places. The application 
for judicial authorization must be submitted by a public prosecutor); Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure 
Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(3) (Czech) (requiring judicial authorization if the observation 
interferes with the inviolability of the home, and allowing entry of dwellings only to place technical 
devices). 
82. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 26(3) (UK) (defining covert 
surveillance as intrusive when “carried out in relation to anything taking place on any residential 
premises or in any private vehicle; and [involving] the presence of an individual on the premises or in 
the vehicle or [being] carried out by means of a surveillance device”). Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 26(5) (UK) specifies that surveillance is not intrusive if it “is carried out 
without [the surveillance] device being present on the premises or in the vehicle,” but will be considered 
intrusive if “the device is such that it consistently provides information of the same quality and detail 
as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the premises or in the vehicle.” 
83. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(3)(b) (UK). 
84. Intrusive surveillance requires authorization from a “senior authorising officer” (Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(1) (UK)), which is usually a chief constable of police 
(Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(6) (UK)). 
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Rather similarly, but applying a more flexible yardstick, Canadian and U.S. law 
consider visual observation by the police—including the use of technical devices—
to constitute an unreasonable search only when it intrudes upon a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.85 Visual surveillance in public places to track a 
suspect is generally considered reasonable, because—as one Quebec court put it—
such a suspect cannot expect any privacy or intimacy there (“ne pouvait prétendre 
à aucun droit d’intimité”),86 or, in the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ terms, 
“[t]he use of video equipment and cameras to record activity visible to the naked 
eye does not ordinarily violate the Fourth Amendment.”87 This conclusion is 
supported by lower court decisions in Canada holding that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in the entrance lobby of an apartment building88 or in 
the public areas of a public bathroom.89 However, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy does exist in a closed bathroom stall in a public bathroom (unless the 
suspect exposes himself under the dividing wall so that he is visible from the public 
areas, in which case any subjective expectation of privacy becomes unreasonable).90 
Similarly, U.S. courts have held that a person cannot maintain a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in activities that occur outside their home and that are visible 
to any passersby (for example, from a public road or sidewalk).91 However, under 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, observation conducted by the 
use of a device that is “not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”); R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (Can.). 
86. R. v. Joyal, [1995] 43 C.R. 4th 317 (Can.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
entrance lobby of an apartment building). 
87. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds,  
531 U.S. 1033 (2000). 
88. R. v. Silva, [1995] 26 O.R. 3d 554 (Can.). 
89. R. v. LeBeau, [1988] CanLII 3271 (ON CA) (Can.). 
90. Id. ¶¶ 49–52. 
91. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016) (“There is no Fourth 
Amendment violation, because Houston had no reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage 
recorded by a camera that was located on top of a public utility pole and that captured the same views 
enjoyed by passersby on public roads.”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The 
Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement 
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere  
fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an  
officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly visible.”). However, in at least one district court, a trial judge has found that  
extended and warrantless video surveillance of a home can violate a reasonable expectation of  
privacy. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025 
EFS (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (“[S]ociety expects that law enforcement’s continuous and covert 
video observation and recording of an individual’s front yard must be judicially approved . . . .”). 
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would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”92 could be 
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.93 
Italy applies a largely similar framework, since tracking a suspect’s movements 
by pedinamento (tailing, etymologically suggesting “following on foot”94) falls under 
the ordinary activities that the police can do without further specific statutory rules 
or safeguards, at least in public places;95 additional conditions apply only if the 
tracking interferes with constitutional rights. Limitations apply particularly if visual 
recordings are made of a followed person in non-public places. Such recordings 
cannot be made at all in homes,96 while they can be made in so-called “reserved 
places” that are not homes but nevertheless carry a reasonable expectation of 
privacy: “[I]f a public toilet or a cubicle such as those at issue are not a domicile, 
they are nevertheless a place which should protect the intimacy and the privacy of 
the persons, and therefore for the purposes of visual recordings they cannot be 
treated as a public place or a place exposed to the public.”97 Visual recordings in 
such reserved places can be made, but only with a motivated decree by a judicial 
authority, which can be a judge or a public prosecutor.98 
While the jurisdictions discussed so far distinguish between observation in 
public and in non-public places, and to some extent depend on the nature of 
technical devices used, Dutch law employs a more abstract distinction, namely 
 
92. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
93. This might include, for example, the use of through-the-wall radar or WiFi signal analysis 
software, each of which could track movements through walls of a home or other constitutionally 
protected areas. 
94. CLAUDIO MARINELLI, INTERCETTAZIONI PROCESSUALI E NUOVI MEZZI DI RICERCA 
DELLA PROVA 227 (2007). 
95. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 55 (It.) 
(defining the task of the police to “conduct the activities necessary to secure the sources of evidence”), 
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] arts. 347–348 (It.) 
(requiring police to report without delay notices of crime to the public prosecutor, and continuing with 
the activities mentioned in article 55, collecting in particular every element useful to reconstruct the fact 
and to identify the perpetrator), and CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE] art. 370 (It.) (allowing the public prosecutor to avail himself of the judicial police to 
conduct investigative and specifically delegated acts). 
96. Cass., sez. un., 28 luglio 2006, Dir. pen. proc., 2006, 1349 et seq. (It.). The constitutional 
protection of domiciles (Art. 14 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.)) serves to protect not only the right to include 
or exclude others from entering the place; it also protects “an intangible sphere of privacy [riservatezza], 
which can also be harmed—through technical devices—without the necessity of physical intrusion,” 
according to GIUSEPPE TABASCO, PROVE NON DISCIPLINATE DALLA LEGGE NEL PROCESSO 
PENALE. LE ‘PROVE ATIPICHE’ TRA TEORIA E PRASSI 155 (2011). To infringe this sphere, the 
Constitution requires a legal basis and a stipulation of legal guarantees, and since these do not exist in 
Italian law for visual recordings in domiciliary places, the Supreme Court concluded that this is not 
allowed. 
97. CORRADO RIZZO, LO STRUMENTO INVESTIGATIVO DELLE RIPRESE VISIVE 48–49 
(2012), referring to Cass., sez. un., 28 luglio 2006, Dir. pen. proc., 2006 (It.). The ground for protecting 
reserved places that are not domiciles is article 2 of the Constitution, which includes the general right 
to privacy. Id. 
98. RIZZO, supra note 97, at 49. 
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between “systematic” and “non-systematic” forms of observation or tracking.99 
Non-systematic observation can be based on the general task description of the 
police without particular conditions,100 while systematic observation requires an 
order of the public prosecutor.101 The conceptualisation of “systematicness” is the 
closest that the Dutch lawmaker has come to defining or describing privacy, so it is 
illuminating to study this criterion in some depth. The generally used definition of 
systematicness is that it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of 
certain aspects of someone’s [private] life.”102 Legislative history, case law, and 
doctrine mention various factors that influence the intensity of the observation and 
thus, qualification of an observation as systematic. They are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions: generally, a combination of factors will be decisive.103 The 
main factors are:104 1) use of a technical device that goes beyond binoculars and 
similar ordinary perception-enhancing devices, such as recording devices;105 2) place 
(observation in public places is a lesser interference than observation in closed or 
intimate places);106 3) intrusiveness, continuity or frequency (the closer, deeper, and 
more frequent the observation, the higher its intensity; continuous observation will 
be more intrusive than observation with intervals);107 4) duration (the longer the 
observation, the higher the intensity);108 and, possibly, 5) the degree of suspicion 
against the observed person (which might influence the reasonable expectation 
someone may hold not to be observed by the police).109 Although analysis using 
 
99. Note, however, that Dutch law generally prohibits visual recordings inside the home 
(although allowing it in other non-public places). See Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 71 
(Neth.). Hence, the distinction between systematic and non-systematic observation comes on top of 
the basic distinction between homes and non-homes as observation sites. 
100. Wet van 12 juli 2012, Stb. 2012, Art. 3 (Neth.). 
101. Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.). 
102. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 26–27 (Neth.). This explanatory memorandum 
used the term “someone’s life,” but it is generally presumed that this refers to someone’s “private life.” 
See, e.g., T. Blom, Comment No. 2 on Art. 126g, in TEKST & COMMENTAAR STRAFVORDERING  
(C.P.M. Cleiren, J.H. Crijns & M.J.M. Verpalen eds., 11th ed. 2015). 
103. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(d–e). 
104. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Dutch Law 29 (Tilburg  
Univ. TILT L. & Tech. Working Paper Series, version 1.0, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837483 
[https://perma.cc/V23X-DZEF] at 29, for a more detailed overview. 
105. The only exception is taking a few photographs, which is considered non-systematic. Blom, 
supra note 102, comment 4(e). 
106. Observation of a suspect’s behavior in public (such as painting graffiti) does not see to  
“a situation in which the suspect could expect to be able to be himself uninhibitedly.” HR 20 april 2004, 
NJ 2004, 525 (Neth.). 
107. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 49 (Neth.). 
108. Duration seems altogether less relevant than the other factors: a short observation with a 
device in an intimate place, such as a brothel, is systematic (Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 47 
(Neth.)), but an observation over a period 27 months in which the suspect was observed 60 times in 
public spaces (mainly by humans, although also by one static camera aimed at someone else’s dwelling) 
was not systematic (HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 (Neth.)). 
109. Although not usually mentioned in textbooks, some case law has indicated that the degree 
of suspicion needs to be taken into account in determining whether an observation makes a more than 
limited infringement on privacy. Hoge Raad 10 april 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0970 (Neth.). 
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these factors leads to a more fine-grained assessment of privacy intrusions, Dutch 
law is similar to the above-mentioned jurisdictions in that even systematic 
observation is considered a relatively unobtrusive investigation power—the only 
real limitation is that a prosecutor’s (but not a court’s) authorization is needed for 
systematic observation.110 
This contrasts to German law, which is the outlier in our jurisdictions as it has 
far stricter limitations to human observation. Only limited forms of tracking can be 
conducted by the police without a warrant: the observation has to take place outside 
the home and—the strongest limitation—can only be conducted for a maximum of 
24 hours.111 Observations longer than 24 hours require a court warrant.112 This 
suggests that location tracking and visual observation, including in public space, are 
considered substantially more privacy-intrusive in Germany than in the other 
jurisdictions we studied. The need for adopting specific, and stricter, regulation of 
longer-term observation in Germany is its perceived potential for considerably 
interfering with the general personality right and the right to self-determination.113 
Especially in cases where such observation is combined with technical means, it can 
lead to such an accumulation of investigative means that a clear personality profile 
of the observed person is created, which intensively interferes with the right to 
informational self-determination.114 Due to this potentially high intrusiveness, 
judicial authorization is required for longer-term observations.115 
B. GPS Tracking 
In most jurisdictions, GPS tracking is considered a form of, or an investigatory 
method analogous to, observation, as it involves observing the movements of a 
person or an object. In this section, we discuss differences and similarities between 
the regulation of GPS tracking and human observation in our jurisdictions. 
1. Mainstream: Not More Intrusive than Human Observation 
By and large, the jurisdictions we studied consider GPS tracking to be about 
as intrusive as (technology-facilitated) human observation. Czech and Italian law do 
not distinguish between the two forms at all and apply the same conditions. In the 
words of the Italian Supreme Court, GPS tracking is “a modality, technologically 
typified, of tailing.”116 Dutch law applies the same framework to both forms,117 
implying that GPS tracking can be equally, more, or less intrusive than human 
 
110. Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.). 
111. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] §§ 161, 163 (Ger.). 
112. Id. § 163f(3). 
113. KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [KARLSRUHER 
COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f (Ger.). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Cass., sez. un., 27 febbraio 2002, no. 16130 (It.). 
117. Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.). 
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observation, depending on the type of device, duration, intensity, and places of 
observation. 
Somewhat similarly, GPS tracking can be more or less intrusive than 
“ordinary” surveillance under U.K. law, depending on the circumstances. On the 
one hand, GPS tracking of cars is regulated as “intrusive surveillance” (subject to 
heightened regulation) if it is “carried out in relation to anything taking place . . . in 
any private vehicle” and involves the use of a surveillance device in a vehicle.118 On 
the other hand, otherwise intrusive surveillance that only involves the use of a 
surveillance device designed or adapted solely to provide information about the 
location of a vehicle (and that does not involve physical trespass) is not considered 
intrusive.119 The relevant code of practice also presumes that such use of a 
surveillance device, on its own, may not always constitute directed surveillance, as 
it may not result in capturing private information about an individual.120 As such, 
the limited use of such a tracking device by itself (e.g., to determine the location of 
a vehicle at one given point in time) may not be subject to regulation at all.  
However, when the use of the device (including when it is used in conjunction with 
other forms of investigatory activities) is likely to result in capturing private 
information (e.g., “monitoring . . . the movements of the occupant(s) of [a] 
vehicle”), the surveillance must be authorized as a form of directed surveillance 
under RIPA.121 
This nuanced regulation of GPS tracking of vehicles in the U.K. suggests, first, 
that location tracking of goods is not considered privacy-relevant while location 
tracking of people is privacy-relevant. Therefore, privacy relevance depends on 
whether installing a tracking device on a car has the purpose of following the car or 
its occupants—a distinction that may be hard to make in practice. Second, the 
privacy intrusion is considered more severe if installing a GPS device involves 
entering the vehicle, since this constitutes trespass. This suggests that in the U.K., 
the privacy of property or of private places is valued more strongly than the 
behavioral privacy that is at issue when someone’s movements are tracked. This is 
similar to Italy, where the literature on GPS tracking discusses whether the driver-
and-passenger compartment of a car is a place of private abode; if so, entering into 
a car to place a GPS tracker would not be allowed in the absence of specific 
legislation stipulating the modality and safeguards.122 A majority of scholarly 
doctrine considers cars to be a place of private abode (and hence protected), while 
 
118. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(3) (UK). 
119. Id. at c. 23, § 26(4). 
120. HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at 17 (“[T]he use of surveillance devices designed or adapted 
for the purpose of providing information regarding the location of a vehicle is not considered to be 
intrusive surveillance. The use of such devices alone does not necessarily constitute directed surveillance 
as they do not necessarily provide private information about any individual, but sometimes only supply 
information about the location of that particular device at any one time.”). 
121. Id. at 18. 
122. See Koops, supra note 104, at 28–29 (including references). 
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a majority of case law does not.123 However, as Bene dryly observes, the discussion 
is highly academic because technological evolution has enabled the placing of GPS 
trackers also on the outside of vehicles, thus foregoing the problem of having to 
enter a protected space.124 (To be sure, this may still constitute an interference with 
property, but that is a relevant consideration only in the U.S. and the U.K.)125 
The argument that GPS tracking does not interfere with the inviolability of 
the home and is limited to tracking people (or objects) in public is also applied in 
Germany. In an oft-cited decision, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) 
judged that the use of GPS technology does not interfere with the constitutional 
right to inviolability of the home; nor does it touch upon the inviolable core 
(Kernbereich) of the private sphere or the right to informational self-determination.126 
It is altogether a “lesser constitutional rights-interfering surveillance measure, for 
which the required judicial control takes place in the criminal proceedings,” and it 
is a proportionate interference in light of the considerable interest in investigating 
and prosecuting crime.127 We see the same reasoning in U.S. case law prior to  
Jones: automobiles moving about on public roads are exposed to public view and 
scrutiny, thus diminishing the expectation of privacy a driver or passenger may have 
in the vehicle’s location.128 
While part of the debate on GPS tracking focuses on spatial privacy, another 
part discusses it in the context of communicational privacy. Associating GPS 
technology with cell-phones (which also have a positioning function, although not 
necessarily GPS), the Italian Supreme Court observed that the constitutional right 
to secrecy of communications was not at stake, since communications interception 
does not include 
the investigative activity conducted to follow the movements on the 
territory of a person, to locate him and therefore to examine—at a 
distance—not the flow of communications that he himself sends or 
receives, but his presence at a specific place at a certain moment, as well as 
the followed itinerary, the encounters that occurred etc.129 
 
123. MARINELLI, supra note 94, at 248. 
124. Bene, supra note 42, at 360. 
125. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In the U.K., GPS tracking will constitute 
property interference if the tracking device is independently attached to property, such as a vehicle, and 
sends back location data to the police; in many situations, this will require a separate authorization under 
the Police Act 1997, besides a RIPA-based authorization for directed surveillance. 
126. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 24, 2001, OLG DU ̈SSELDORF, 3 
StR 324/00 (Ger.). 
127. Id. 
128. See e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153–54 & n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality 
opinion); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976) (“One has a lesser expectation of privacy 
in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as 
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”). 
129. Cass., sez. un., 27 febbraio 2002, no. 16130 (It.). 
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In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights judged “that GPS 
surveillance must be considered to interfere less with a person’s private life than, 
for instance, telephone tapping,”130 and found that “GPS surveillance is by its very 
nature to be distinguished from other methods of visual or acoustical surveillance 
which are, as a rule, more susceptible of interfering with a person’s right to respect 
for private life, because they disclose more information on a person’s conduct, 
opinions or feelings.”131 In other words, because GPS tracking of a car only registers 
a person’s movements (in public), it is considered less intrusive than wiretapping 
and human observation, since only people’s bare location coordinates are recorded, 
rather than what they do, say, or otherwise express through their conduct in situ. 
In summary, the larger picture is that in statutory and case law, GPS tracking 
is generally considered not more (and sometimes even less) intrusive than human 
observation. 
2. Undercurrent: More Intrusive than Human Observation 
In contrast to the mainstream picture, we observe an undercurrent in case law, 
and particularly in doctrine, that recognizes a potentially larger privacy intrusion 
through GPS tracking. A relevant factor is that a GPS tracker records location with 
high frequency by itself, without humans having to be close to the tracked person 
or car. The GPS tracking in the Uzun case was considered acceptable partly because 
it was applied only after a less intrusive measure had failed: Uzun and his accomplice 
had detected and destroyed the transmitters (Peilsender) previously installed in the 
car, “the use of which (other than with the GPS) necessitated the knowledge of 
where approximately the person to be located could be found” and which was “less 
intrusive” than GPS surveillance.132 Similarly, in the only Canadian Supreme Court 
case on the constitutionality of warrantless location tracking (R. v. Wise), the court 
found that a transmitter (or beeper) was only minimally intrusive because “it was 
capable of giving only a very rough idea of the vehicle’s location. Certainly, it could 
not be said that the device was capable of tracking the location of a vehicle at all 
times.”133 Since GPS tracking is capable of just that, the Wise rationale would not 
apply, and GPS tracking would therefore probably constitute an unreasonable 
search in Canada, although the courts have not yet decided this specific question. 
A more extensive argument has been made by the Polish District Court in 
Suwałki, judging that using a GPS tracker undoubtedly led to collecting and 
processing of a much larger, and more precise, set of data about the places the 
 
130. Uzun v. Germany, App. No. 35623/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 72 (2010). 
131. Id. § 52. 
132. Id. § 78. 
133. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (Can.). (finding that use of a beeper (“a low power radio 
transmitter”) constituted an unreasonable search because it violated the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location and movements of his vehicle and because it was installed after 
the expiration of a valid warrant, but that the search was “only minimally intrusive” and the tracking 
evidence should not be excluded). 
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observed person stayed, as well as data on how they moved in public space, than 
could be obtained by direct observation.134 Therefore, it constituted a further-
reaching interference in private life.135 Additionally, the covert manner of the 
operation of a GPS device, combined with the way the device communicated 
(sending regular messages through a mobile phone network), constituted 
operational surveillance under Article 19(3) of the Police Act (Poland), which is 
subject to strict procedural requirements.136 The District Court rejected the idea 
that, since anyone can observe a vehicle moving in public space, the information 
obtained by GPS tracking could be seen as publicly available.137 The court 
contrasted such individual bits of information that lead to no significant 
conclusions about the person, with systematic collection of location data for a 
longer period, which reveals where the person went, for how long, and where they 
moved.138 The latter constitutes surveillance of the person and a violation of 
freedoms and rights of the person.139 Interestingly, whereas the wording of Article 
19(3) of the Police Act (Poland) at the time was sufficiently technology neutral 
(“using technical means to covertly obtain information and evidence”) to 
accommodate GPS tracking, the provision has since been split into a list of more 
specific powers,140 none of which easily fits GPS tracking. It is therefore 
questionable whether the new wording of Article 19 of the Police Act (Poland) on 
operational surveillance, which only mentions visual and aural observation and 
recording, still allows for the use of GPS trackers by police.141 
Using similar arguments as the Suwałki court, Italian scholars heavily criticize 
the Italian (case) law’s equation of GPS tracking with human tailing. They provide 
arguments for why GPS tracking is more invasive than traditional tailing: it can be 
very precise and continuous, and it can also track people in places that are not visible 
or readily accessible (where human tailing would be impracticable or not allowed);142 
it has fewer practical obstacles in time and space;143 and it constitutes a greater 
privacy infringement than classic tailing because of the thoroughness of the 
investigation and the possibility to protract it for long periods.144 On the other hand, 
authors also observe that a person’s movements are tracked only when the tagged 
car or object is being used, which is less frequent than continuous human tailing.145 
 






140. Police Act art. 19 (Pol.). 
141. OPALINSKI, ROGALSKI & SZUSTAKIEWICZ, supra note 57, at 76. 
142. Bene, supra note 42, at 352; Marinelli, supra note 94, at 237; Stefano Marcolini, Le cosiddette 
perquisizioni on line (o perquisizioni elettroniche), CASSAZIONE PENALE 2855, 2867 (2010). 
143. Marinelli, supra note 94, at 237; Marcolini, supra note 142, at 2867. 
144. Daniela Gentile, Tracking satellitare mediante gps: attività atipica di indagine o intercettazione 
di dati?, DIRITTO PENALE E PROCESSO 1464, 1472 (2010). 
145. Bene, supra note 42, at 352. 
First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2019  10:14 AM 
656 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:635 
Moreover, physical tailing enables police to see the location of others during 
meetings, which is not possible with electronic tailing unless the other persons are 
also being electronically monitored.146 Overall, however, Italian authors tend to 
consider GPS tracking to constitute a more serious privacy infringement than 
human tailing, although still less serious than intercepting communications. 
Perhaps the most forcible argumentation about the privacy infringement made 
possible by GPS tracking has been made in United States v. Maynard (which later 
became Jones on appeal to the Supreme Court).147 The judge stressed that the facts 
of the case, which involved continuous GPS monitoring of the defendant’s vehicle 
over a 28-day period, addressed the question whether “dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices” such as “‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance . . . 
require[ ] a warrant.”148 The judge held that prolonged GPS monitoring of a vehicle 
for twenty-eight days amounted to an unreasonable search because the GPS 
monitoring had obtained information that was “not exposed to the public”: 
[U]nlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s 
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the 
public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is 
effectively nil. Second, the whole of one’s movements is not 
exposed constructively even though each individual movement is exposed, 
because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than 
does the sum of its parts.149 
And, according to the judge, prolonged GPS tracking violated the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, in part because 
[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-
term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not 
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal 
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told 
by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the 
course of a month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but 
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a 
different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce 
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, 
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one 
such fact about a person, but all such facts.150 
 
146. Marinelli, supra note 94, at 236–37. 
147. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
148. Id. at 556, 558. 
149. Id. at 558; see also infra Section III(B)(3)(b). 
150. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
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This reasoning was later endorsed at the Supreme Court by both of the 
concurring opinions in Jones.151 
In this undercurrent of arguments, we see a recognition that GPS tracking may 
have superficial similarities with traditional forms of location tracking but involves 
a different way of tracking. The affordances of GPS differ from human observation: 
in several respects, location tracking is more fine-grained, easier, and wider in scope 
than human observation, while in other respects, it may be less detailed. This implies 
that GPS tracking cannot easily be judged to be intrinsically more intrusive than 
technology-facilitated human observation; nor, however, can it be simply equated 
with traditional forms of observation. We think this is the main reason why authors, 
and sometimes judges, have proposed different normative frames to evaluate the 
intrusiveness of GPS tracking, such as the mosaic theory152 or a right not to be 
localized153—frames that have yet to be adopted in mainstream thinking and case 
law on location tracking, but that have potential for changing the legal evaluation of 
GPS and other forms of tracking with different affordances than human tailing. 
3. Installing GPS Trackers on (Items Worn by) Humans 
Some jurisdictions apply special rules for installing and using tracking devices 
on human bodies, or on items usually carried by humans, as this is considered a 
graver (or different type of) privacy infringement than tracking cars or other objects. 
The Netherlands has the most far-reaching limitation: technical devices for 
observation purposes may not be placed on a person, except with the person’s 
consent.154 “On a person” means on the body or clothes, including on items carried 
in clothing, such as a lighter; a tracking device may, however, be placed on a 
suitcase.155 This implies that items usually carried in clothes’ pockets, such as 
smartphones, may not be tracked with a tracking device. The distinction between 
items carried “on” the person and items carried “by” the person seems subtle, but 
can be explained by the constitutional framework, which contains a separate 
constitutional right to bodily integrity.156 Interfering with items carried “on” the 
person (i.e., on the skin or in clothes) constitutes an interference with the body, 
while items carried by (but not on) persons, such as bags or suitcases, do not fall 
 
151. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at  
428–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
152. See infra Section III(B)(3)(b). 
153. See infra Section III(B)(3)(a). 
154. CPC Art. 126g(3) (Neth.). With the Computer Crime III Act (adopted in June 2018, entry 
into force 1 March 2019), an exception is made for hacked devices: the police are allowed to hack into 
a device (such as a smartphone) carried on the body for the purposes of systematic observation (e.g., 
remotely install location-tracking software or malware to turn on the smartphone’s camera). See 
Staatsblad 2018, 322 at 5–6 (Neth.). 
155. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3 at 71 (Neth.). 
156. GW. art. 11. 
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within the scope of bodily integrity.157 The prohibition of planting tracking devices 
on persons is in line with how privacy is generally protected in Dutch criminal 
procedure: bodily privacy is regarded as the most important aspect of privacy and 
is generally more strongly protected than spatial or communicational privacy.158 
The Netherlands is an outlier in this respect, however. In other jurisdictions, 
persons (and items carried on persons) can be tracked, albeit sometimes under 
stricter conditions than those that apply to tracking objects. In Grady v. United States, 
the Court held that “a State . . . conducts a search when it attaches a device to a 
person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s 
movements.”159 Therefore, a warrant is required for non-consensually installing a 
tracking device on a person. In Canada, the Canadian Criminal Code distinguishes 
between two types of tracking warrants.160 Parliament determined that tracking 
individuals (or things “usually carried or worn by” individuals, such as cell-phones) 
was more privacy-invasive than tracking vehicles or the location of transactions and 
should be based on a higher standard of proof; namely, “reasonable grounds to 
believe”161 rather than “reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will 
be committed . . . and that tracking [an individual, thing, or transaction] will assist 
in the investigation of the offence.”162 Thus, the distinction between installing 
tracking devices on persons as opposed to objects is far less strict than in the 
Netherlands: the U.S. has a warrant requirement for both humans and cars, while 
Canada applies only a stricter condition in terms of the level of suspicion, but not 
in terms of authorization.163 
C. Cell-Phone Tracking 
Where GPS tracking (of the sort described above, as typified by the facts of 
Jones) depends on the police covertly installing a device to trace movement patterns, 
a different form of location tracking uses the location data that people themselves 
 
157. Note that placing tracking devices in items (usually) carried by persons will, nevertheless, 
imply following a person, and therefore (if it crosses the threshold of systematicness) will falls under 
the power of systematic observation and require a prosecutor’s order. See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 
403, no. 7 at 48 (Neth.). 
158. Koops, supra note 104 at 52. 
159. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015). This did not concern criminal 
investigation, but a state program that mandated satellite-based monitoring of certain recidivist sex 
offenders after they had completed their sentences. 
160. Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, S.C. 2014, c 31 (Can.). 
161. R.S.C. § 492.1(2) (Can.) (emphasis added). 
162. Id. § 492.1(1) (emphasis added); see also R. v. Grandison, [2016] B.C.S.C. at para. 34. 
163. See also TAMIR ISRAEL & CHRISTOPHER PARSONS, 2 GONE OPAQUE?  
AN ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHETICAL IMSI CATCHER OVERUSE IN CANADA 69  
(2016), https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160818-Report-Gone_Opaque.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5D4-9QDY] (“[D]ifferentiation between Object Tracking and Individual 
Tracking Warrants may be unsustainable since both kinds of surveillance can engage roughly equivalent 
privacy interests. Tracking an individual’s car, for example, can provide a comprehensive picture of that 
person’s location and, over time, of their personal life as it would indicate the stores they visit, the 
medical clinics they visit, the religious institutions they visit, the people they visit, etc.”). 
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generate (also sometimes by GPS) through their cell-phones. The primary way that 
police acquire such data is by obtaining and serving a production order on a 
telecommunications provider, but this can be supplemented by other measures such 
as the use of stealth SMS or IMSI catchers.164 Since cell-phones rely on cells to 
communicate, and cells have a geographic position with a range of tens of miles to 
some tens of yards (depending on the population density), location data from  
cell-phones provide an interesting source for tracking people’s movements. 
Additionally, if wireless carriers (or service providers, e.g., Google) also capture and 
maintain GPS or Wi-Fi location data sourced from their subscribers’ cell-phones, 
location information can be even more precise than cell site location information. 
And, in contrast to the physical installation of tracking devices considered in the 
previous section, accessing GPS or other location information through cell-phones 
or other connected devices can be accomplished remotely, without any physical 
intrusion. 
In Carpenter, the U.S. Supreme Court cited its earlier decision in Riley  
v. California,165 noting that tracking the location of a cell-phone presents significant 
privacy concerns because cell-phones have become “almost a ‘feature of human 
anatomy,’” so that “when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it 
achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the 
phone’s user.”166 In the subsections that follow, we discuss the regulation of cell-
phone tracking in the jurisdictions in our sample. 
1. Production Order to Telecoms Providers of Cell Phone Location Data 
a. Historical Data 
All jurisdictions in our study consider cell-phone location data to be part of, 
or similar to, the metadata (or traffic data) that can be requested from telecoms 
providers,167 and generally, these jurisdictions treat metadata as less privacy-
 
164. See Brad Heath, Police Secretly Tracking Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 23, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-
surveillance/31994181/ [https://perma.cc/2GJZ-DD7Y] . 
165. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
166. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484); 
see also discussion infra Section II(C)(1)(a). 
167. See, e.g., s. 66(3) of Act No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police (Czech) (mentioning location data 
alongside traffic data that can be requested from public communications providers); CPC art. 254-bis 
(It.) (including location data (data di ubicazione) among the data stored with informatics, telematics, and 
telecommunications providers that can be acquired through seizure); art. 2 Besluit vorderen gegevens 
telecommunicatie 2004, Stb. 2004, 394 (Neth.) (including cell location in the mobile network among 
traffic data of which production can be ordered); Judgement of the Constitutional Court, 30 July 2014, 
sign. K 23/11, OTK ZU 2014, nr 7, poz. 180 (Pol.) (including data allowing the identification of the 
geographical location of the communication parties among metadata); United States v. Carpenter, 819 
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (obtaining cell tower locational data from defendants’ wireless carrier is similar 
to obtaining metadata as regulated by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.); RIPA 
§ 21(6)(a) (Eng.) (defining location data as within the definition of “traffic data,” which is obtainable 
subject to “authorisation” under RIPA § 23). For additional analysis of UK law, see SIMON MCKAY, 
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sensitive than communications content.168 As a result, not all jurisdictions require a 
warrant for a location-data or metadata production order. A warrant is required to 
acquire historical CSLI in Germany169 and—after Carpenter—in the U.S. In Czechia, 
a warrant is required for traffic data “that are subject to telecommunications secrecy 
or the protection of personal and intermediation data,”170 but not for traffic and 
location data that are not subject to such protection—these latter data can be 
ordered by the police.171 In Canada, a production order can be given to telecom 
providers to disclose historical tracking data, which requires authorization by a 
justice or judge and “reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will 
be committed . . . and the tracking data is in the person’s possession or control and 
will assist in the investigation of the offence.”172 
In contrast, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland consider authorization from a 
public prosecutor sufficient.173 Moreover, the Italian Supreme Court has also ruled 
that the absence of an authorisation from a public prosecutor does not render 
produced traffic data unusable as evidence, given the limited intrusion into the 
private sphere and given that it does not fall under the strict norms for 
interception.174 
In the U.S., the legal status of CSLI changed considerably with Carpenter. In 
prior cases involving police accessing historical location information from cellular 
service providers under the Stored Communications Act,175 courts generally held 
that no search had occurred, citing the third-party doctrine and equating location 
information with non-content information (such as that captured by pen registers) 
that attracts lesser constitutional protection.176 Under the Stored Communications 
 
COVERT POLICING: LAW AND PRACTICE 127–29 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2015). Note that 
Canada has separate powers for the production of transmission data (i.e., metadata) (section 487.016 
CC) and production of tracking data (i.e., location data) (section 487.017 CC), but the requirements are 
the same and both orders use the same form (Form 5.007). 
168. See, e.g., Cass., Sez. V, 10 marzo 2010, n. 9667 (It.), as discussed in Gentile, supra note 144 
(holding that obtaining traffic data constitutes a limited intrusion into the private sphere and does not 
fall under the strict norms for interception); Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 989, No. 3 at 19  
(Neth.) (holding that there is no justification to accord all traffic data the same level of constitutional 
protection as communications content); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (finding 
numbers dialed on a phone less protection-worthy than content). 
169. CPC § 100g juncto §§ 101a, 100e (Ger.); see also Benjamin Vogel, Patrick Köppen & Thomas 
Wahl, Germany, in ACCESS TO TELECOMMUNICATION DATA IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 499, 545 (Ulrich 
Sieber & Nicolas von zur Mühlen eds., 2016). 
170. CPC § 88a(1) (Czech). 
171. § 66(3) Act No 273/2008 Sb. on the Police (Czech); see Radim Polcák, Czech Republic 
Slovakia, in ACCESS TO TELECOMMUNICATION DATA IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 387 (Ulrich Sieber and 
Nicolas von zur Mühlen eds., 2016). 
172. CC [CRIMINAL CODE] § 487.017 (Can.). 
173. DATA PROTECTION ACT Art. 132(3) (It.); CPC art. 126n(1) (Neth.); CPC art. 218(1) (Pol.). 
174. Cass., Sez. V, 10 marzo 2010, n. 9667, as discussed in Gentile, supra note 144. 
175. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
176. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that government did not 
conduct a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes when it obtained cell tower locational data from 
defendants’ wireless carrier—based on the non-content/metadata distinction and the third-party 
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Act, the government could access such records so long as it demonstrated 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the records were “relevant and material to an 
ongoing investigation,”177 a lesser standard than the probable cause required for a 
warrant. (Note, however, that at the state level, a warrant may have been required 
for obtaining some cell-phone location information, even prior to Carpenter.)178 
However, in Carpenter, a majority of the Supreme Court held that “the ability 
to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone 
signals” provided police with information that was “detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled”179—thus implicating Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In doing 
so, the Court ruled that police could not rely on less-demanding court orders under 
the Stored Communications Act to acquire such information from service providers 
and that the third-party doctrine did not apply to the acquisition of historical 
CSLI.180 In fact, the Court noted that “historical cell-site records present even 
greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered 
in Jones,”181 precisely because, 
[u]nlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone . . . 
tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner. While individuals 
regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them 
all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public 
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.182 
Besides authorization requirements, some jurisdictions limit the power to 
order location-data production to relatively serious crimes: crimes with a maximum 
penalty of at least three (Czechia) or four (Netherlands) years’ imprisonment, or 
serious crimes (Germany).183 Other jurisdictions, however, have no such limitation 
in type or seriousness of offenses. 
 
doctrine); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that cell-site tracking without 
a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine), overruling United 
States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(obtaining CSLI under the SCA not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes), overruled 754  
F.3d 1205 (2014). 
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
178. Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, ACLU  
(Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-location-privacy-legislation-states-
2015 [https://perma.cc/QT6Q-3WVP] (mentioning six states protecting both historical and real-time 
location information from warrantless search). 
179. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018). 
180. Id. at 2217. 
181. Id. at 2218. 
182. Id. (citations omitted). 
183. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 88a/2012 Sb. (Czech) (for traffic data 
that are subject to the protection of personal and intermediation data); STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 
[StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100g (Ger.) (translation at The German Code of  
Criminal Procedure StPO, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ,  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/index.html [https://perma.cc/D46U-V3KD] 
( last visited Feb. 3, 2019)); Art. 126n para. 1 Sv (Neth.). 
First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2019  10:14 AM 
662 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:635 
Overall, then (with notable exceptions), a production order for location data 
seems to constitute a moderate to intermediate form of privacy intrusion—certainly 
not negligible, but also definitely not as intrusive as communications interception. 
This state of the law is criticized by general literature arguing that the distinction 
between metadata and content is outdated (in the normative sense, since collecting 
metadata can be at least as intrusive as interception)184 and specific literature 
claiming that national law on traffic data collection has too few safeguards.185 
However, with few exceptions,186 such criticism has not yet induced lawmakers or 
judges to revise the way they assess the intrusiveness of metadata production orders. 
Specifically, for location metadata (as opposed to metadata in general), some 
courts have advanced interesting arguments to assess the privacy intrusion, also in 
comparison with other forms of tracking. As framed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Carpenter (using reasoning drawn from the concurring opinions in Jones), historical 
CSLI 
provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with 
GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into 
a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through 
 
184. See, e.g., BERT-JAAP KOOPS & JAN SMITS, VERKEERSGEGEVENS EN ARTIKEL 13 
GRONDWET, EEN TECHNISCHE EN JURIDISCHE ANALYSE VAN HET ONDERSCHEID TUSSEN 
VERKEERSGEGEVENS EN INHOUD VAN COMMUNICATIE 140–41 (2014) (arguing that traffic data 
provide ever more insight into private life and that there is less reason nowadays to protect (only or 
particularly) communications content); Bryce Clayton Newell & Joseph T. Tennis, Me, My Metadata, 
and the NSA: Privacy and Government Metadata Surveillance Programs, in ICONFERENCE 2014 
PROCEEDINGS 345, 346 (2014) (“[M]etadata surveillance can be highly intrusive to personal privacy – 
even more revealing than the content of our communications in some cases . . . .”); Sophie Stalla-
Bourdillon, Evangelia Papadaki & Tim Chown, Metadata, Traffic Data, Communications Data, Service 
Use Information. . . What Is the Difference? Does the Difference Matter? An Interdisciplinary View from 
the UK, in DATA PROTECTION ON THE MOVE 437, 461 (Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes & Paul De 
Hert eds., 2016) (arguing that application-level metadata should be protected in the same way as 
communications content); Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515–16 (observing that “traffic data serve to 
paint an ever clearer picture of communication participants” and that “the access to mere traffic data 
(without even targeting communication content) is in and of itself viewed as a significant encroachment 
on the secrecy of telecommunication”). But see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the 
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2010) (arguing that the content/non-
content distinction “reflect[s] an essential underlying dynamic of the switch from the physical world to 
the network environment” and should be confirmed in future decisions). 
185. See, e.g., Filippo Raffaele Dinacci, Localizzazione attraverso celle telefoniche, in LE INDAGINI 
ATIPICHE 369 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., 2014) (arguing that the Italian law, in allowing traffic data production 
on the basis of art. 256 C.p.c. (It.), is effectively unconstitutional, given that a mere authorization from 
the Public Prosecutor suffices and in light of the lack of any other legal safeguards); Maciej Rogalski, 
Udostępnianie danych telekomunikacyjnych sądom i prokuraturom, PROKURATURA I PRAWO, 2015, no. 12, 
at 68 (criticizing the Polish provisions for lack of subsidiarity requirements and for disproportionately 
affecting individuals who have no connection to the crime). 
186. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018) (requiring warrants for access 
to historical CSLI and ruling that the third-party doctrine does not apply to such data); U.S. v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”). 
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them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. 
These location records hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’ And 
like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and 
efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of 
a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of 
historical location information at practically no expense.187 
In finding a greater privacy intrusion that necessitated greater protection for 
location information (in relation to other forms of metadata), the Carpenter court 
specifically addressed how “the retrospective quality” of CSLI could provide the 
police with 
access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, 
attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of 
records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the 
Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s 
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices [sic] of the wireless 
carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years.188 
Additionally, the Court repeatedly noted its assessment that CSLI granted law 
enforcement something akin to “perfect surveillance”:189  
[B]ecause location information is continually logged for all of the 400 
million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons 
who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking 
capacity runs against everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police 
need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular 
individual, or when. Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively 
been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police may—
in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance 
without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few 
without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.190 
Even prior to Carpenter, other courts had compared CSLI to GPS and other 
forms of tracking. For example, in 2010, a district judge in the Southern District of 
Texas compared historical CSLI to GPS tracking.191 Acknowledging differences in 
timing (CSLI being recorded historical data, GPS tracking involving prospective 
data) and initiative (the police being responsible for creating GPS data, but not for 
creating historical CSLI data), the Texas judge considered CSLI to be more invasive 
than GPS in that it could also monitor indoors (in contrast to GPS tracking of cars) 
and reveal more since the cell-phone is carried on the person.192 As a result, and 
 
187. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (citations omitted). 
188. Id. at 2218. 
189. Id. at 2210. 
190. Id. at 2218. 
191. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone 
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 505–06 (2012) (referring to In re U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010)). 
192. Id. 
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following Maynard’s reasoning, the judge held that (even imprecise and intermittent) 
warrantless CSLI was unconstitutional.193 Under state law (involving higher 
protection than the Fourth Amendment), the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, 
in 2013, that “[w]ith increasing accuracy, cell phones can now trace our daily 
movements and disclose not only where individuals are located at a point in time 
but also which shops, doctors, religious services, and political events they go to, and 
with whom they choose to associate.”194 Thus, “the cell site locations of telephone 
calls made and received may yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive 
information about the individual’s ‘comings and goings’ in both public and private 
places.”195 
b. Future Data, or Real-Time Cell Phone Location Tracking 
Most jurisdictions in our study not only allow police, through the collection of 
cell-phone location data, to acquire historical traffic data (i.e., data about 
movements in the past), but they also allow police to acquire future or real-time 
traffic data (i.e., data about future movements, usually under the same, or only 
slightly stricter, conditions). This turns a data production order into a power 
analogous to covert surveillance to track a person’s movements, such as tailing or 
GPS tracking. 
For instance, Dutch electronic communications providers can be ordered to 
produce incoming, future data for a period of up to three months, which have to 
be provided real-time.196 (This applies, however, only to location data when the 
phone is used for an actual or attempted communication and not to location data 
generated when the phone is merely in stand-by mode.)197 Similarly, the German 
provision on location-data production includes the situation that location data are 
provided in real time, in cases of serious crime and if it is necessary for the 
investigation,198 and the Czech provision on traffic and location data requests by 
police can involve “remote and continuous access.”199 
While these countries treat real-time cell-phone location tracking under the 
general power for real-time provisioning of cell-phone metadata, Canada separates 
these explicitly.200 Bill C-13 from 2014 removed “location” from the power to 
 
193. Id. 
194. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) (quoted in Susan Freiwald, Light in the 
Darkness: How the LEATPR Standards Guide Legislators in Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell 
Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 877, 883 (2014)). 
195. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 863 (Mass. 2014) (quoted in Freiwald, supra 
note 194, at 883–84). 
196. Art. 126n ¶¶ 1–3 Sv (Neth.). 
197. Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 059, No 3 at 8 (Neth.). Location data of phones in stand-by 
mode might be requested on the basis of art. 126ng Sv (Neth.), but this applies only to stored data, not 
to real-time provisioning of incoming location data. 
198. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100g, para. 1 
(Ger.) (translation at The German Code of Criminal Procedure StPO, supra note 183). 
199. Zákon o Policii České republiky [Police Act], Zákon č. 273/2008 Sb., § 66(3) (Czech). 
200. See Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 66. 
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obtain transmission data and explicitly prohibits its use as a tracking power;201 
instead, location data are included in the “more protective”202 power to obtain 
tracking data.203 A tracking warrant “may contain any conditions that the justice or 
judge considers appropriate, including conditions to protect a person’s 
interests”204—a provision that the transmission data recording warrant lacks. A 
tracking warrant targeted at a specific individual, for “identifying the location of a 
thing that is usually carried or worn by the individual,” applies a higher standard of 
proof205 than the standard for transmission-data warrants or for tracking warrants 
targeted at transactions or things. A tracking warrant can be combined with an 
“assistance order”206 designed to ensure, for example, that a telecommunications 
provider assist law enforcement in tracking a device, such as a cell-phone, by 
providing data or access to data required for such purposes. 
In the United States, CSLI can also be ordered in real time—so-called 
“prospective CSLI,”207 and the Carpenter court explicitly did not address real-time 
CSLI.208 Some courts have held that prospective or real-time CSLI should be 
granted less liberally than historical CSLI, given that Congressional intent when 
passing the Stored Communications Act was more in line with historical data; other 
courts have held that the two should be treated identically.209 In real-time CSLI 
cases, courts have also applied the reasoning from Knotts to determine that 
defendants did not have legitimate expectations of privacy in their location while 
they moved about in publicly accessible places, such as public highways,210 or phone 
tracking has been justified under the authority of warrants or other court orders, 
and as such, has not been unreasonable.211 On the other hand, a district judge 
 
201. Criminal Code, R.S.C.1985, c. C-46, § 492.2(3) (Can.) (“No warrant shall be issued under 
this section for the purpose of obtaining tracking data.”). 
202. ISRAEL & PARSONS, supra note 163, at 68. 
203. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1 (Can.). See R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC 
1712 (Can. B.C.) and surrounding text. 
204. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(4) (Can.). 
205. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(1)–(2) (Can.); Grandison, 2016 BCSC at 
para. 34 and surrounding text. 
206. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 487.02 (Can.). 
207. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 494 (referring to In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,  
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835–36 (S.D. Tex. 2010)). 
208. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Our decision today is a narrow 
one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download 
of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”). 
209. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 505. 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (interception of cellular phone 
data revealed defendant’s general location while traveling on public highways. The Court applied Knotts, 
finding “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site data because the DEA agents could have 
obtained the same information by following Garner’s car”). 
211. See, e.g., United States v. Luna-Santillanes, 554 F. App’x. 402 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United 
States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that exclusion of evidence was not proper remedy 
for government’s failure to comply with procedural requirements for preparing, executing, and 
returning a warrant for a tracking device, namely precise location information from defendant’s cell 
phone). 
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offered interesting arguments to support the view that prospective CSLI, if 
conducted for a period of up to thirty days, is privacy-intrusive and not comparable 
to surveillance of movements in public. This is so, in the judge’s view, because the 
police will not know in advance whether the target is in a constitutionally protected 
place, such as a home, and users tend to keep their cell-phones on (or close to) their 
persons.212 And, unlike cars, “it is ‘almost unimaginable’ that a cell phone would 
remain entirely within public spaces.”213 The judge also argued that, for the purposes 
of arresting someone, continued tracking provides “different and arguably more” 
information than a place-based search, revealing intimate details of a person’s life 
that entering someone’s home need not reveal.214 In the end, however, the reasoning 
in Carpenter and Jones seems to imply that the acquisition of CSLI (in any form, 
historical or future) would need to be supported by a warrant because it intrudes on 
reasonable expectations of privacy215—although, presumably, it may depend on the 
period over which future or real-time CSLI would be collected before it equals the 
broad historical “encyclopedia” of information at issue in Carpenter. 
In contrast to the countries that allow prospective cell-phone location 
tracking, Poland does not seem to have a provision providing a possibility for real-
time collection of traffic data.216 
2. Stealth SMS and GPS Ping 
The usefulness of a production order of cell-phone traffic data to track 
someone’s movements (or rather, their phone’s movements) is dependent on the 
number of times the phone is actually used. After all, telecom providers usually only 
store traffic data of actual communications (or communication attempts), and 
location data of phones in stand-by mode may not be possible to collect in real time 
from providers, at least in the Netherlands217 and possibly in the United States.218 
(However, this may differ for other types of service providers, such as producers of 
applications installed on a user’s smartphone, which might collect location data 
 
212. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011) [hereinafter Specified Wireless Tel.] (citing a 
study that 65 percent of U.S. adults have slept with their phone nearby), discussed in Rothstein, supra 
note 191, at 518. 
213. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 519 (citing Specified Wireless Tel., supra note 212, at 543). 
214. Id. at 519–20 (citing Specified Wireless Tel., supra note 212, at 550). 
215. For instance, in Carpenter v. United States., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018), the court held 
that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements 
as captured through CSLI” does not seem to be, on its face, limited to historical CSLI. 
216. ANDRZEJ ADAMSKI, CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION IN POLAND 39 (2015),  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279191115_CYBERCRIME_LEGISLATION_IN_ 
POLAND [https://perma.cc/KM6F-4TYE] . 
217. Kamerstukken II, supra note 197. 
218. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 504 (citing a minority of courts that held that federal statute 
allowed CLSI acquisition only when the target made and received calls). 
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more continuously and when devices are not being used.)219 To ensure that 
sufficient location data are generated to be able to track a cell-phone’s movements 
with considerable precision, police have employed a method referred to as “stealth 
SMS” or “silent SMS” (SMS, or short messaging service, being the original 
technology used for texting).220 These stealthy text messages remain hidden from 
the mobile phone’s user but do generate traffic data (since an actual 
communication, albeit covert, occurs).221 
Police use of stealth SMS has been discussed in Germany and the Netherlands, 
and to some extent in the United States; presumably, police in other countries may 
also be using this method, but it has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested in 
Supreme Court cases or discussed in mainstream literature in the other jurisdictions 
in our study. In Germany, it is used very frequently: several federal law-enforcement 
agencies sent over 150,000 silent SMS messages in the first half of 2014 alone.222 
The statutory basis for it has “not yet been conclusively settled.” However, the 
discussion revolves around the question of whether, or to what extent, sections 100a 
et seq. of the German Criminal Code, possibly in combination with the general 
investigative clauses in section 163(1) and section 161(1), “can be used beyond their 
respective wording for not only passively accessing data generated independent of 
investigation authorities, but also for actively inducing such a generation of data.”223 
Some authors argue that silent SMS can be based on section 100h(1)(2), which 
allows special technical devices for observation purposes to be used against suspects 
(or against others if there are grounds to believe they have contacts with the suspect 
and the measure will lead to establishing the suspect’s location), for crimes of 
substantial significance, and “silent SMS” can be interpreted as such a special 
technical observation device.224 
In the Netherlands, the use of stealth SMS to locate a suspect is also 
“frequently” used.225 It has been accepted on the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act 
of 2012—the general task description of the police, on which minor privacy 
 
219. See e.g., Keith Collins, Google Collects Android Users’ Locations Even When Location Services 
Are Disabled, QUARTZ (Nov. 21, 2017), https://qz.com/1131515/google-collects-android-users-
locations-even-when-location-services-are-disabled/ [https://perma.cc/G8QC-7CQA]. 
220. See Text Messaging, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Text_messaging 
[https://perma.cc/V6Y8-LQSH] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019); SMS, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/SMS [https://perma.cc/4TTN-YNA6]  ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019). 
221. See Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 550–51. 
222. Id. at 551 (referring to DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/2257, 9 
(Ger.)). 
223. Id. at 551; Ulrich Eisenberg & Tobias Singelnstein, Zur Unzulässigkeit der heimlichen 
Ortung per „stiller SMS”, 25 NSTZ NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 62 (2005) (observing that 
generation of the data is the core feature of the measure of silent SMS, as this enables creating a precise 
movement profile independent from the user’s behavior, and arguing that the measure for this reason 
is intrusive and lacks the required specific legal basis). 
224. Sigrid Hegmann, StPO § 100h Weitere Maßnahmen außerhalb von Wohnraum, in BECKOK 
STPO WITH RISTBV AND MISTRA, para. 6 ( Jürgen Peter Graf et al. eds., 30th ed. 2018) (Ger.). 
225. G. ODINOT ET AL., HET GEBRUIK VAN DE TELEFOON- EN INTERNETTAP IN DE 
OPSPORING 131 (2012). 
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intrusions can be based without a specific statutory basis in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.226 The Supreme Court has deemed stealth SMS to involve a minor 
privacy intrusion.227 The circumstances of the case are relevant, however, given that 
the Court argued that the duration and frequency (ninety messages in five days) 
were such as to create only a limited image of the phone user’s movements. 
Additionally, the court stated, there was authorization from the public prosecutor 
and an order for systematic observation and communications interception had 
already been given to enable other investigation methods. And, despite flaws in 
reporting, sufficient clarity had been acquired about how the method had been 
used.228 In other situations—for instance, if used for a longer period or with very 
high frequency—use of stealth SMS is likely to be deemed to constitute more than 
only a minor privacy intrusion, given that someone’s movements recorded over a 
longer period of time or with very high frequency are likely to result in a more or 
less complete image of certain aspects of someone’s private life.229 Therefore, in 
these circumstances, the public prosecutor would be required to authorize an order 
for systematic observation (Article 126g of the Dutch Criminal Code) or, in the 
proposed new Code, an order for systematic determination of location.230 
In the United States, a slightly different form is discussed in the literature, in 
which law enforcement obtains a court order to have a service provider “ping” a 
cellular phone at particular times or intervals that enables the provider to calculate 
the phone’s location based on its GPS coordinates, which are more precise than 
ordinary cell-site information.231 In multiple cases, the Sixth Circuit has held that 
pinging GPS coordinates of a phone is not a Fourth Amendment search since it 
does not constitute a trespass or invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.232 
Importantly, this reasoning has emerged from cases where the tracking was for a 
relatively short period of time (less than that at issue in Jones). In such cases, the 
third-party doctrine would also not seem to apply, since the data are generated at 
law enforcement’s initiative and not voluntarily transmitted by the user.233 
 
226. M.J. Borgers, Normering van ‘lichte’ opsporingshandelingen, 15 DELIKT & DELINKWENT 
143, 143 (2015). 
227. HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1569 (Neth.). 
228. Id. See Borgers, supra note 226, for an extensive discussion. 
229. Cf. Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 20 juni 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:2579 § I(D.2) (Neth.). 
230. Proposed art. 2.8.2.10.1, Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48;  
see also Memorie van Toelichting 23–24 (Feb. 2017), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
kamerstukken/2017/02/07/memorie-van-toelichting-vaststellingswet-boek-2-van-het-nieuwe-wetboek- 
van-strafvordering-het-opsporingsonderzoek [https://perma.cc/7G3V-PUAA] (Neth.). 
231. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 495. 
232. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forest, 355 
F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
233. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 510 (referring to United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543  
U.S. 1050 (2005), which determined that the third-party doctrine does not apply if police dial the 
subject’s cell phone to generate CSLI). 
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3. IMSI Catchers (Stingrays) 
An International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher (sometimes also 
called a Stingray) is a cell-site simulator, that is, a device that resembles a cell-phone 
base station and attracts the traffic of mobile phones in its vicinity.234 It is usually 
used to acquire someone’s unknown telephone number (or IMSI number) by 
operating the IMSI catcher in the vicinity of the target so that the target’s phone 
makes contact with the simulator (if done at a few different places, this will usually 
enable uniquely identifying the target’s number). However, an IMSI catcher can also 
be used to locate a suspect’s phone if the number is already known. For instance, 
U.S. police used an IMSI catcher in United States v. Rigmaiden235 (a fraud case) to 
trace a prepaid data card connected to a laptop, of which they only had an IP 
address; the telecom provider had been able to locate the data card within a quarter-
square-mile area, but could provide no more precise location, and the IMSI catcher 
was used to track the card exactly to the suspect’s apartment.236 
Police use of IMSI catchers is specifically regulated in Germany and the 
Netherlands. Germany enables both functionalities of identifying an unknown 
number237 and establishing the location of a mobile device.238 The measure requires 
a warrant239 and an offense of substantial significance,240 and it can be ordered for 
at most six months (which can be prolonged repeatedly with six-month periods).241 
Data of third persons can only be collected if it is technically inevitable; these can 
only be used for data mining to retrieve the sought-after number and must be 
deleted immediately afterward.242 
In the Netherlands, Article 126nb of the Dutch Criminal Code regulates use 
of an IMSI catcher, but this is limited to the purpose of acquiring identification 
information; Article 126nb cannot be used to collect location or other metadata. An 
IMSI catcher may nevertheless also be used as a tracking device, to determine where 
the phone user is located. The Supreme Court has allowed this in a specific case on 
the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 (the general provision allowing minor 
privacy intrusions, without specific safeguards), in light of the short duration of its 
use in the present case and the authorization of the public prosecutor, and the fact 
that it only revealed the phone’s (user’s) location, but not what the user does or 
 
234. See IMSI-catcher, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI-catcher 
[https://perma.cc/AK74-8AQ5] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019). 
235. United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
236. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore:  
The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security 
and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29–30 (2014). 
237. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100i(1)(1) (Ger.). 
238. Id. § 100i(1)(2). 
239. Id. §§ 100i(3), 100b(1). 
240. Id. § 100i(1). 
241. Id. § 100i(3). 
242. Id. § 100i(2). 
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says.243 It added, however, that, in general, if the duration, intensity, and frequency 
are such as to enable acquiring a more or less complete image of a part of someone’s 
private life, IMSI catcher localization cannot be based on Article 3 of the Police Act 
of 2012 and requires a specific statutory basis;244 this could be systematic 
observation (Article 126g of the Dutch Criminal Code) or, in the proposed new 
Code, an order for systematic determination of location,245 both of which require 
an authorization from the public prosecutor, but not a warrant. 
In other countries, IMSI catchers are also used, but the legal status is 
somewhat less clear. In Czechia, IMSI catchers (nicknamed “Agáta”) seem to be 
used by police, but we have not found any legal discussion of this. We assume the 
measure can be based on section 158d(2) of the Czech Code of Criminal Procedure 
(observation), which allows covert obtaining of information about persons and 
objects by technical means.246 While this is the same type of measure as the German 
provision, it requires authorization from a public prosecutor, not a judge.247 
In the United States, cases challenging the use of these devices are as yet 
relatively scarce. Although law enforcement has argued since 2001 that an  
IMSI catcher can be based on pen register or trap and trace orders (to record  
traffic data),248 several judges have denied applications because the pen/trap statute  
does not see to recording traffic data from unidentified devices.249  
In United States v. Patrick,250 the Seventh Circuit held that the warrantless use of an 
IMSI catcher to locate a suspect with an outstanding warrant did not require 
exclusion of evidence when it was used to locate the suspect in a public space.251 
However, the court explicitly avoided a full analysis of whether the use of the 
simulator was itself a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, leaving that analysis 
for future cases.252 In another more recent Seventh Circuit case, United States  
v. Sanchez-Jara,253 Judge Easterbrook held that an IMSI catcher could be effectively 
authorized by a warrant under section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act 
(when issued upon a finding of probable cause), but only insofar as the device used 
would not capture “information that would require a wiretap warrant” under 18 
 
243. HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1562 (Neth.). The exact duration is not mentioned in 
the judgement, but was at most three days (the IMSI catcher was used on April 26, 2010 to narrow 
down the geographic location of the phone, and the suspect was arrested on April 28). 
244. Id. 
245. Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48 (proposed Art. 2.8.2.10.1). 
246. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb., § 158d(1)–(2) (Czech). 
247. Id. § 158d(2). 
248. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 236, at 27. 
249. Id. at 21 (referring to In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Use 
of a Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995)); id. at 29 (referring to 
In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & 
Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747,751 (S.D. Tex. 2012)). 
250. United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2016). 
251. Id. at 545. 
252. Id. 
253. United States v. Sanchez-Jara, 889 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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U.S.C. sections 2510–2522 (such as the contents of communications).254 In 
Rigmaiden (a district court decision), the government acknowledged that an IMSI 
catcher’s use to locate a data card constituted a Fourth Amendment search and had 
in fact obtained a search warrant pursuant to Rule 41(b).255 Relevant in this case is 
that the card turned out to be inside a residence, a possibility that law enforcement 
had foreseen—as a prosecutor stated in a hearing: 
It’s not the nature of the data; it’s the nature of the interest. And the—the 
nature of the—the legal interests, the Fourth Amendment—you know, 
where you have an expectation of privacy is where we would recommend 
using the search warrant as opposed to just a pen register order.256 
Indeed, as Pell and Soghoian observe, use of IMSI catchers in many cases 
“necessarily involves sending signals through the walls of homes and apartment 
buildings or penetrating briefcases, purses, and pockets in order to identify the 
phones contained within.”257 In that light, it makes sense that the policy guidance 
adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2015 on IMSI catchers states that, as 
a matter of policy, law enforcement must (except in emergencies or exceptional 
circumstances) obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause and issued 
pursuant to Rule 41 (along with pen/register authorization).258 Although the policy 
states that cases of exceptional circumstances that make obtaining a search warrant 
impracticable are expected “to be very limited,” and agents still need approval from 
the agency’s executive-level personnel, the relevant U.S. Attorney, and a Criminal 
Division DAAG,259 the “questionably broad definition of exceptional situations” 
has been called a “central weakness” in the policy.260 
The situation in Canada is less clear, although Canadian agencies are 
apparently using IMSI catchers.261 According to Israel and Parsons, the Criminal 
Code contains “a patchwork of overlapping electronic surveillance powers that 
could potentially apply to IMSI Catcher use, each with varying levels of 
safeguards.”262 They argue that the use of IMSI catchers is most similar to 
individual-targeted tracking and should therefore comply with “Individual 
 
254. Id. at 421 (“Given the district judge’s finding of probable cause—a finding that carries a 
strong presumption of correctness this warrant suffices to support use of a cell-site simulator that does 
not gather information that would require a wiretap warrant.”) (internal citations omitted). 
255. Pell and Soghoian, supra note 236, at 30 (referring to United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 
08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013)). 
256. Id. at 31 (quoting Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings: Motion Hearing at 61,  
United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC)). 
257. Id. at 32. 
258. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download 
[https://perma.cc/A7YD-RKHU]. 
259. Id. at 4. 
260. Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 54. 
261. Id. at 57. 
262. Id. 
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Tracking” warrants, “[g]iven the capacity of IMSI Catcher-obtained data to reveal 
the movements of individuals, now and in the future . . . .”263 
D. Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) 
Automated license/number plate recognition (ALPR) is used in many 
countries to scan license plates of cars on public roads, often on a large scale with 
static cameras or mobile cameras. Images can be retained in a database for a certain 
period, to enable data mining and ex post searches, or recognition can take place in 
real-time based on a hit list of sought-after license plates without images being 
necessarily stored.264 ALPR is used for a wide range of law enforcement and other 
government purposes; we discuss here only briefly its use in criminal investigation. 
In Germany, ALPR can be used to locate an accused during police checks on 
the basis of section 163e of the German Criminal Code (police observation), in cases 
of offenses of substantial significance and where other means of establishing the 
facts or determining the perpetrator’s whereabouts would offer much less prospect 
of success or be much more difficult.265 It can be used against other persons only 
if it can be assumed that they are linked to the perpetrator, that the measure will 
lead to determination of the perpetrator’s whereabouts, and that using other means 
would offer much less prospect of success or be much more difficult.266 Additional 
plates can be included in the observation if the car is registered to or used by the 
accused or by a thus far not identified person who is suspected of a crime of 
substantial significance.267 The use of ALPR under section 163e requires 
authorization from a judge.268 
In contrast to Germany, ALPR does not fall under the Dutch power of 
systematic observation, as it does not involve systematic following of a person. ALPR 
might be based on Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 if the police are looking for 
particular cars with known license plate numbers from a reference database, which 
are automatically matched with the plate numbers of cars passing by, and the 
photograph and plate number of an observed car is recorded only if a match is 
found.269 The general use of ALPR cameras on highways to record passing traffic 
 
263. Id. at 69–70; cf. the argumentation in Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance 
Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 109–10 (2017) (observing that “the 
use of a device to force a person’s cellphone to provide the police with precise locational data—in some 
cases within two meters of the cellphone—echoes similar legal debates about whether the Fourth 
Amendment governs the government’s collection of vast amounts of locational data, even in public 
spaces,” with reference to the concurring opinions in Jones). 
264. Roger Clarke, The Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in  
Australia (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/ANPR-
Surv.html [https://perma.cc/FE5D-6CZA] (distinguishing two ANPR architectures: the “mass 
surveillance” and “blacklist-in-camera” approaches). 
265. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163e(1) (Ger.). 
266. Id. § 163e(1); see also Urs Kindhäuser, STRAFPROZESSRECHT § 8, Rn. 18–19 (4th ed. 2016). 
267. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163e(2) (Ger.). 
268. Id. § 163e(4). 
269. CORSTENS & BORGERS, supra note 47, at 333. 
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is not allowed for criminal investigation purposes; it has been used in the past by 
several police units, with recordings being stored for weeks or months, but the Data 
Protection Authority determined that this lacked a legal basis.270 A bill is now 
pending in the Senate to allow large-scale ALPR registration, with a storage period 
of four weeks.271 Investigation officers would be able to consult the ALPR database 
in cases that involve investigations of relatively serious crimes (generally those 
carrying a maximum imprisonment of at least four years) or in cases of fugitive 
suspects (this requires an order from the public prosecutor).272 In terms of privacy 
safeguards, Article 5 of the proposed Order in Council to further regulate ALPR is 
interesting: it stipulates that only public places can be monitored and that measures 
must be taken to prevent images of car users being consulted; thus, “ANPR cameras 
must be focused and fine-tuned in such a way as to prevent as much as possible the 
recognizable presence of non-public places or persons on the photos of the 
vehicle.”273 Since such recording could nevertheless happen, the officer accessing 
the database should remove the photo or make the place or person unrecognizable 
before giving it to the requesting officer.274 
The possibilities for accessing the central ALPR database are considerably 
broader in the U.K. Records can be kept up to two years and consulted up to 90 
days after their creation for ordinary crimes—up to one year for “serious 
investigations” (such as blackmail, perverting justice, or rape) or “major 
investigations” (such as murder or kidnapping).275 For major investigations, records 
can also be requested after one year with written authority of an inspector.276 In 
Canada, ALPR data fall under the definition of “personal information” for purposes 
of federal and provincial privacy acts but is generally not subject to the Canadian 
Charter’s prohibitions on unreasonable searches.277 Specifically, the British 
Columbia Privacy Commissioner has held that the retention (but not the initial 
 
270. College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, Onderzoek naar de verwerking van no-hits bij de 
inzet van Automatic Number Plate Recognition Regionaal politiekorps IJsselland ( Jan. 2010); College 
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, Onderzoek naar de verwerking van no-hits bij de inzet van Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition Regionaal politiekorps Rotterdam-Rijnmond ( Jan. 2010). 
271. Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 33 542, No. A (Neth.). 
272. Id. (proposed Art. 126jj SV). 
273. Art. 5(3) Besluit inzake het vastleggen en bewaren van kentekengegevens van het Wetboek 
van Strafvordering door de politie (draft), Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 33 542, appendix to No. C (Neth.). 
274. Id. at Art. 5(4). 
275. See HOME OFFICE, NATIONAL ANPR STANDARDS FOR POLICING.  




277. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on The Big Data  
Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, And Access to Government 
Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 411 (2014). But see INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF 
ONTARIO (ICPO), GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF AUTOMATED LICENCE PLATE RECOGNITION 
SYSTEMS BY POLICE SERVICES ( 2017), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
alpr_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/3URE-UR8Z] (urging police services to ensure that their ANPR 
programs respect Charter-protected privacy rights). 
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collection) of certain obsolete and “non-hit” information violated provincial privacy 
law.278 In the United States, a number of states have regulated the use of ALPR, but 
there is no applicable federal law (including the Fourth Amendment, as long as the 
scanning happens in publicly accessible places where persons are deemed to not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy) to regulate such surveillance more broadly 
or consistently across the country.279 
E. Other Forms of Location Tracking 
While (technology-enhanced) human observation, GPS tracking, cell-phone 
tracking, and ALPR are the most widely used forms of location tracking by police 
in the jurisdictions we studied, law enforcement can and do use a wide variety of 
other forms of tracking. In this section, we highlight some interesting alternative 
tracking methods we encountered in our research, typically in the context of a 
particular jurisdiction. The description here is not comparative. Rather, it is 
illustrative, designed to show how specific jurisdictions incorporate new or 
alternative tracking methods in their legal system. 
Cars and cell-phones leave traces of people’s movements, but electronic 
transactions in banks, ATMs, and shops can also provide insight into someone’s 
whereabouts. The Canadian Criminal Code explicitly includes such data in the 
regulation of tracking production orders;280 section 487.017 allows the police to 
make ex parte applications for court orders requiring third parties to produce 
documents containing tracking data, defined as “data that relates to the location of 
a transaction, individual or thing.”281 Similarly, based on the Czech Police Act, police 
can, without authorization, request data about time and place of used electronic 
payment methods from banks or data about place and time of provided health 
services from health insurance companies and healthcare providers, but only to 
search for missing or searched persons, not for evidence-gathering in general.282 
Although location data are not explicitly mentioned, they may also fall under the 
data that can be ordered from service providers in other jurisdictions; for instance, 
Dutch police can, with authorization from the Public Prosecutor and for relatively 
serious crimes, order production of any data from someone likely to store it,283 
which will include transaction data. If ordered data are likely to include “sensitive” 
data (i.e., on religion, race, health, political views, sex life, or trade-union 
 
278. Newell, supra note 277, at 411 (citing Elizabeth Denham, Office of Info. & Privacy 
Comm’r of B.C., Investigation Report F12-04: Use of Automated Licence Plate Recognition Technology by 
the Victoria Police Department 10–11 (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/
1480 [https://perma.cc/597B-H2LB]); see also ICPO, supra note 277, at 9 (similar finding under 
Ontario’s privacy act). 
279. For a discussion and analysis of these state laws (current as of 2014), see Newell, supra note 
277, at 404–10. 
280. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
281. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 487.011 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
282. Zákon o Policii [Police Act], Zákon č. 273/2008 Sb., § 68 (Czech). 
283. Art. 126nd SV (Neth.). 
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membership), the police must obtain a warrant and the offense being investigated 
must be a particularly serious crime.284 
Another way to trace a known suspect whose whereabouts are unknown is the 
classic method of publishing their description or picture in the hope that someone 
recognizes them and asking the public to inform the police accordingly. This is 
explicitly regulated in Germany, where section 131a of the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Notice to Determine Whereabouts) allows notices to be 
published in newspapers or otherwise broadcasted, in cases involving an offense of 
substantial significance and a high level of suspicion (dringend verdächtig). This 
measure can be used if other measures to determine the whereabouts are 
considerably less likely to succeed.285 The published notice may include pictures.286 
Such notices can also be used to trace witnesses, but the notice has to make clear 
that the sought person is not the accused. Furthermore, witness pictures can only 
be published if alternative tracking methods are hopeless or substantially more 
difficult and there is an absence of preponderant protection-worthy interests of the 
witness.287 Pictures can also be published on the basis of section 131b of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, particularly in cases where the suspects’ or witnesses’ 
identities are unknown, under generally similar conditions.288 
A more recently developed method is the use of directional Wi-Fi tracking 
antennas and associated software to trace unknown users of an unprotected Wi-Fi 
network. In the United States, defendants in a growing number of (primarily) district 
court decisions have challenged the investigatory use of this method.289  
Generally, police have used these technologies to identify locations where child 
pornography or other illicit material is being downloaded via Wi-Fi routers.  
In United States v. Stanley,290 police knew child pornography was being shared from 
a particular IP address, but a warrant-based search of the home associated with the 
IP address was unsuccessful (because the suspect was “piggybacking” on an open 
Wi-Fi network).291 With the consent of the homeowner, police used 
MoocherHunter software, which measures the distance between the router and the 
computer connecting to it, and by moving the antenna of the wireless router, police 
could trace the computer to a specific apartment.292 According to the court, this did 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search since the defendant “did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the wireless signal he caused to emanate from 
 
284. Art. 126nf SV (Neth.). 
285. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 131a(3) (Ger.). 
286. Id. §§ 131(4), 131a(4). 
287. Id. § 131a(4). 
288. Id. § 131b. 
289. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 117. 
292. Id. at 116–17. 
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his computer.”293 Although the defendant invoked Kyllo, arguing that the software 
was not in general public use and was used to discover his computer inside his 
home, the court distinguished Wi-Fi tracking from thermal imaging because, in 
contrast to Kyllo who did not send the heat to a third party and tried to contain it in 
his garage, Stanley had “voluntarily caused a signal to be sent directly to [the] 
wireless router” of a neighbor and therewith “voluntarily conveyed [the signal] to a 
third party.”294 Besides using directional antennas to physically locate the source of 
Wi-Fi transmissions, police have frequently located computers based on IP 
addresses.295 
Similarly sophisticated but more physical in character, Dutch police have 
applied the so-called “flock fiber method” (flockvezelmethode) to investigate a large 
number of burglaries in remotely located houses and farms.296 This involved 
spraying the seats in a suspect’s car with a specially developed microfiber spray 
(similar to what is called “synthetic DNA” spray)297 and a fluorescent substance; the 
fibers attach themselves to the clothes of those sitting in the seats. If these fibers 
(which are uniquely identifiable) are found at a crime-scene, this provides evidence 
of a link between the car owner and the crime.298 The method was not 
comprehensively tested in court, due to legal-technical issues; the Court of Appeal 
found that the method did not infringe the right to a fair trial to such an extent that 
the public prosecutor should be declared inadmissible in prosecuting the case, and 
the Supreme Court agreed.299 The advocate general, in his advice to the Supreme 
Court, offered an interesting reflection on this method. He argued that privacy was 
not as such an issue here, given that the spray did not establish a complete trail of 
movements, but only linked the suspect with the location of the crime scene, “which 
is not a space where the burglar can reasonably be himself uninhibitedly.”300 Rather, 
the seriousness of the method consisted, according to the advocate general, in the 
intrusiveness of breaking into the car to apply the spray, which was questionable in 
light of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 (which only allows minor privacy 
intrusions) and in causing the suspect to be the carrier of artificial traces, which was 
problematic in light of the regulation of systematic observation (which prohibits 
putting a tracking device on a person301).302 
 
293. United States v. Stanley, No. CRIM. 11-272, 2012 WL 55129987, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 
2012). 
294. Id. at *16–17. 
295. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App’x 610 (6th Cir. 2015). 
296. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 3.2 (Neth.). 
297. See, e.g., Francisca Grommé, Provocation: Technology, Resistance and Surveillance in Public 
Space, 34 ENV’T & PLANNING D: SOC. & SPACE 1007 (2016) (discussing the introduction of a marker 
spray in Dutch urban public transport to conceptualize the role of technology in everyday resistances 
against surveillance). 
298. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 3.2 (Neth.). 
299. HR 3 mei 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:462 (Neth.). 
300. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 4 (Neth.). 
301. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
302. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 4 (Neth.). 
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III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
As the previous section’s overview has shown, law enforcement agencies use 
various methods of location tracking, often on the basis of different statutory 
powers or conditioned by different legal-protection regimes. In this section, we 
analyze whether patterns can be discerned in the ways in which the countries we 
studied deal with the privacy implications associated with these manifold tracking 
methods. The analysis proceeds from two perspectives. First, we discuss the factors 
that courts or lawmakers use to assess the intrusiveness of a particular tracking 
method or case, which should give some insight into how privacy is protected in 
this context. Second, we discuss how privacy is framed in the argumentation, which 
reveals the underlying conceptualizations of privacy that seem to inform courts’ and 
lawmakers’ assessment of tracking’s intrusiveness. This offers insight into the nature 
of the privacy interest(s) at issue in police tracking. Together, these perspectives 
provide insight into how privacy is protected in the context of police tracking and 
how boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy intrusions are drawn. 
A. Which Factors Influence the Seriousness of Privacy Infringements? 
A useful starting point for discussing factors used in assessing how seriously 
some form of location tracing interferes with privacy is the list of factors emerging 
from the Dutch conceptualization of “systematicness.”303 Most of these factors also 
turn up in several other jurisdictions, which also apply some additional factors. 
Overall, then, we can discern eight relevant factors. As in Dutch law,304 none of 
these will constitute a necessary or a sufficient condition on its own in any of our 
jurisdictions: generally, a combination of factors will be decisive. 
1. Use of a Technical Device 
Courts and lawmakers often recognize that technological affordances matter, 
especially since technology-facilitated surveillance will often have greater impact 
than mere human perception-based surveillance. Nevertheless, use of a technical 
device in itself is not necessarily determinative. In the German Uzun judgment, the 
court observed that section 163f of the Criminal Code on “longer observation” only 
contains an element of duration, and hence applies to all “longer” forms of 
observation regardless of whether they are executed with a technical device.305 And 
the Dutch lawmaker takes a nuanced approach: 
In observation, technical devices reinforce and support human functions. 
From that perspective, observation with technical devices is not a separate 
category [from human observation]. (. . .) The turning point is not whether 
or not a technical device is used, but the intensity of the observation.  
Still, observation with a device that is a little more sophisticated than  
 
303. See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
304. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(d)–(e). 
305. BGH Jan. 24 2001, 3 StR 324/00 (Ger.). 
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common-or-garden binoculars, will in practice soon have sufficient 
intensity or frequency to be systematic.306 
Thus, the main factor is not technology use as such, but whether a technical 
device merely enhances or facilitates what humans can perceive anyway (or goes 
beyond that). Ordinary devices that merely enhance human senses, such as 
binoculars, do not in themselves, in Dutch law, lead to “systematic” observation, 
but stronger forms of human-sense enhancement, such as using a telescope, may 
result in it.307 The Polish District Court in Suwałki observed that a GPS tracker 
facilitated a much larger and more precise insight into someone’s movements than 
is possible with direct human observation,308 much like the concurring opinions of 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones. However, courts 
may also argue that technology-based tracking does not go significantly beyond 
human perception, as had several U.S. decisions decided prior to Jones and Carpenter. 
For example, in Knotts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of a beeper merely 
augmented the visual surveillance capabilities that police could generally use. As 
such, it did not alter the Court’s conclusion that surveillance on public roads and in 
“open fields” did not attract Fourth Amendment protections because the suspects 
voluntarily exposed their movements in such places to third parties. And “[n]othing 
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them in this case.”309 In a similar vein, the Sixth Circuit in 
United States v. Forest310 observed that there was “no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the cell-site data because the DEA agents could have obtained the same 
information by following Garner’s car.”311 Altogether, the assessment of location 
tracking’s intrusiveness seems to require a fine-grained analysis of the particular 
affordances of technical devices at issue and nuanced argumentation regarding how 
it compares to human observation. Beepers give less comprehensive insight in 
movement patterns than GPS trackers and, similarly, telescopes are more intrusive 
than binoculars. There is, apparently, a fine line between devices that merely 
strengthen but do not really alter the possibilities of human perception, and those 
that augment human perception to the extent that they do make a qualitative 
difference. And this fine line between mere perception-strengthening and 
qualitative enhancement may also shift over time.312 
Another aspect of technology that makes a qualitative difference is recording. 
While Czech law does not distinguish between human and technical tracking as 
 
306. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, No. 3 at 70 (Neth.). 
307. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e). 
308. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
309. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
310. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005). 
311. Id. at 951. 
312. Cf. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 21 (holding that surveillance law must be 
“particularly precise, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more 
sophisticated”). 
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such, written approval of the prosecutor is required as soon as recordings are made 
of what is being observed.313 In Dutch law, any recording of the observed will make 
the observation “systematic,” even during a short period, as this facilitates exact and 
complete reproduction of the observed at any later moment, which is not possible 
with human senses. The only exception to this general rule is taking a few 
photographs, which is considered non-systematic.314 And, in Canadian law, it 
appears that the long-term retention of ALPR scan data enabled by recording 
capabilities crosses the relevant threshold for legality. Polish law seems to be an 
outlier in this respect, as it does not consider recording to be a relevant factor as 
such.315 
2. Place 
The place(s) where someone’s movements are tracked is a second important 
factor. It often matters whether location tracking concerns movements in public 
places or (also) in private places, such as homes. Tracking in public is often 
considered to only constitute a minor interference with privacy as such,316 while 
tracking in private places is often considered intrinsically intrusive.317 Certain other 
factors can alter this assessment, such as sophisticated technology use318 and 
intensity,319 but not always easily so. Duration, for example, often seems less 
important than place. In Dutch law, for instance, a lengthy observation of someone 
in places where his behavior could be observed by anyone will not result in the 
person feeling limited in his right to undisturbed privacy,320 but a short observation 
with a device in an intimate place, such as a brothel, is already considered 
systematic.321 In the United States, this distinction was recognized (but not 
applicable) in Knotts, and it was dispositive in United States v. Karo, where police 
tracked cans of ether into the suspects’ homes using a beeper, violating the Fourth 
Amendment.322 Thus, the publicness of a place is a major factor in the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis in the United States. 
 
313. See Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(2) (Czech). 
314. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e); see also Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
16 (observing that technologically monitoring a scene in public is of a similar character as human 
observation, but that privacy considerations may arise “once any systematic or permanent record comes 
into existence”). 
315. Art. 15(5a) Police Act (Pol.) (allowing both observation and recording). 
316. See, e.g., supra notes 86–89, 106, 127–28, 210, 249, 272 and accompanying text. 
317. See infra Section III.B.1.b. 
318. See supra Section III.A.1. 
319. See infra Section III.A.3. 
320. HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS § 5.3 (Neth.). 
321. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 47 (Neth.). 
322. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984). 
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3. Intensity: Depth, Continuity, and Frequency 
The third factor in the Dutch list is the intensity of observation, which is an 
amalgam of closely related sub-factors, such as the depth, continuity, and frequency 
of surveillance. The closer, deeper, more continuous, or more frequent the 
observation, the higher its intensity. Continuous observation will be more intrusive 
than observation with intervals.323 This factor also informed the court’s assessment 
in Maynard, where the judge argued that while the GPS-tracked car may have moved 
in public, its movements were not actually exposed to the public over the period of 
28 days “because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is 
effectively nil.” Additionally, the continuity of tracking over this period resulted in 
an overall picture that was more intense than individual observations at discrete 
points in time could reveal.324 Thus, the court found that the combination of 
duration and intensity outweighed the fact that the tracking occurred in public places. 
Similar arguments emphasizing the high intensity of (longer-term) GPS tracking as 
compared to human tailing are advanced in Italian doctrine, although not yet in in 
Italian case law itself.325 At the same time, Italian authors also point out that GPS 
tracking is less intense than human tailing in some respects,326 again demonstrating 
that a fine-grained analysis of how particular tracking technologies afford more or 
less intrusive insight into people’s movements and behavior is required. 
4. Duration 
The duration of tracking is a fourth factor. Although evidently relevant—
tracking someone for a year is obviously more intrusive than doing the same for a 
day—duration is a highly fluid factor, and the length of observation will usually only 
matter to the degree that other factors (such as place327 and intensity328) make it 
more or less intrusive. The only exception in our sample is Germany, which 
considers any form of observation longer than 24 hours to be intrusive.329 In other 
jurisdictions, the fluidity of duration can be seen in highly divergent assessments of 
the intrusiveness of tracking over various periods of time: 28 days of (continuous) 
GPS tracking of a car was considered sufficiently intrusive as to require a warrant 
in Jones,330 but three months of (non-continuous) GPS-based car tracking was 
considered “a relatively short period of time” in Uzun.331 Thirty days was considered 
 
323. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 49 (Neth.); cf. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI  
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (observing that the tracking occurred essentially only at weekends and when traveling 
in accomplice’s car); R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 534 (Can.) (“Certainly, it could not be said that the 
device was capable of tracking the location of a vehicle at all times.”). 
324. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
326. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
327. See, e.g., supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text. 
328. See, e.g., supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
329. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f(1) (Ger.). 
330. See supra notes 66–67, 151. 
331. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27. 
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reasonable by the Canadian Supreme Court, especially given the “the urgent need 
to protect the community” from a suspected serial killer.332 While such evaluative 
differences may relate to differences in countries’ legal systems, we think they more 
likely result from the influence of other factors, such as the different intensity 
(continuous as opposed to interval-based tracking) in Jones and Uzun. This is 
corroborated by the role duration plays within single jurisdictions: Dutch law, for 
instance, treats tracking someone’s location in or near a brothel for a day or so as 
systematic,333 as is (continuous) “observation lasting for nine months,”334 yet 
observation over a period of 27 months in which the suspect was observed 60 times 
in public spaces (mainly by humans, although also by one static camera aimed at 
someone else’s dwelling) was considered non-systematic.335 Also, we encounter 
different assessments of duration in relation to different tracking technologies: car 
tracking for one or two days would likely not be considered particularly privacy-
intrusive in the United States, but some scholars consider location records, in the 
context of law-enforcement access to third-party records, “highly private” if they 
cover more than 24 hours.336 This suggests that the intensity of what location 
tracking can reveal colors the interpretation of the tracking’s duration, rather than 
the other way around. The relativity of duration as a factor is, finally, also visible in 
the European Court of Human Right’s observation in Uzun that the lack of a fixed 
statutory limit on the duration of monitoring was compensated by the general 
requirement of proportionality.337 
5. Degree of Suspicion 
A minor factor in the Dutch list, not mentioned in textbooks but occasionally 
applied in case law, is the degree of suspicion against someone.338 In a few cases, 
Dutch courts have observed that someone engaging in criminal activity (such as 
spraying graffiti) or being associated with a burglary crime-scene cannot have a 
reasonable expectation to not be observed by the police.339 Similarly, a U.S. court 
 
332. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 538 (Can.). 
333. See HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS § 5.3 (Neth.). 
334. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 50 (Neth.). 
335. HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS (Neth.) (before art. 126g Dutch CPC was in 
force, but the judgement is still a touchstone in the interpretation of systematic observation, according 
to Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e)). 
336. See Freiwald, supra note 194, at 913 (referring to Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and 
Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 819 (2013) and agreeing with his conclusion that, in Freiwald’s 
summary, “most location records would fall under the highly private category,” while “information for 
a period of up to twenty-four hours [is] moderately private, and information for a single point in time 
[is] not private.” (footnotes omitted)). 
337. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 23. 
338. This is also a factor influencing the acceptability of privacy intrusions, as seen in statutory 
or case law requirements for a certain level of suspicion to be met, but here we discuss it as a factor 
influencing the seriousness of the privacy intrusion. 
339. See supra notes 106, 301; see also HR 10 April 2001, NJ 2001, 424 m.nt. § 3.4 (Neth.)  
(finding that degree of suspicion can be considered when assessing the lawfulness of observation). 
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held that contraband, by its very nature as something that a suspect has no legal 
right to possess in the first place, cannot attract a legitimate expectation of privacy; 
thus, tracking it cannot violate a Fourth Amendment interest.340 Such 
argumentation suggests that if there is a high likelihood that someone is involved in 
criminal activity, they have a lower reasonable expectation not to be tracked by 
police, which apparently (at least in some cases) will diminish the seriousness of the 
privacy intrusion. 
6. Object of Tracking 
Not included in the Dutch list of intrusiveness-influencing factors as such, but 
quite prominent in the Dutch statutory regulation of observation, is the object of 
tracking—a factor that we also find in other jurisdictions. Generally, tracking a thing 
is less intrusive than tracking a person (except, as noted, if something is tracked into 
someone’s home). Placing (non-consensually) a tracking device on a person (i.e., on 
the body or clothes, or on items typically carried in clothing, such as smartphones) 
is prohibited in Dutch law and is regulated more strictly in Canada and the United 
States.341 Similarly, in U.K. law, location tracking of goods is not considered privacy-
relevant, while location tracking of people is; as a consequence, it depends whether 
installing a tracking device on a car has the purpose of following the car or its 
occupants342—a distinction also made in the Dutch regulation of ALPR recordings, 
which only allows photographing (license-plate carrying parts of) cars but not 
people.343 
Prior to Carpenter, lower-court judges in the United States had similarly argued 
that acquiring cell-site location information is intrusive because cell-phones are 
worn on or kept close to the body, both for historical344 and for prospective345 
CSLI. This holding was confirmed by the Supreme Court (at least for historical 
records) in Carpenter. Because of the close association of cell-phones with persons, 
Canadian scholars also have argued that IMSI catchers for location tracking require 
an “Individual Tracking” warrant, not a warrant to track a thing.346 
Altogether, then, it matters in several jurisdictions whether location tracking 
uses a method that interferes with bodily privacy or yields location information 
closely associated with a physical person, as opposed to methods that track the 
location of things not usually carried on or close to the human body. 
 
340. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1976). 
341. See supra Section II.B.3. 
342. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra notes 272–73. 
344. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 193. 
345. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011) [hereinafter Specified Wireless Tel.] (citing a 
study that 65 percent of U.S. adults have slept with their phone nearby), discussed in Rothstein, supra 
note 191, at 518. 
346. See Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 57. 
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7. Covertness 
The Dutch list of factors does not include covertness: although it may not 
usually be useful for police to track someone overtly, Dutch law considers this 
equally intrusive as covert tracking if done in a systematic way (i.e., depending on 
technology use, place, intensity, and duration).347 In contrast, covertness is a primary 
factor in the U.K. regulation of surveillance, since visual observation is subject to 
RIPA’s authorization requirements only when it is covert.348 Polish law does not 
distinguish between overt and covert observation in public places,349 but the 
Suwałki District Court found the covert nature of GPS tracking to be a relevant 
factor for applying stricter procedural requirements.350 
Somewhat remarkably, covertness works the other way around in the Italian 
framework for GPS tracking, where overt tracking turns out to be considered more 
intrusive than covert tracking. Since GPS tracking is not specifically regulated, it 
counts as an atypical means of searching for evidence (Article 189 of the Italian 
Criminal Code), implying that results can be admitted by the judge if they are 
suitable for proving the facts and do not prejudice the moral liberty of the person; 
the latter is only the case when persons are affected in their mental freedom to 
choose. Since GPS tracking is a covert measure, unnoticed by the subject, and the 
resulting data are not statements (expressions of the mind), the followed person’s 
mental self-determination is not at stake. Thus, the results of GPS tracking can be 
used as evidence.351 Here, we see that the intrusiveness of location tracking has 
multiple dimensions and that interference with physical or behavioural privacy 
may—at least in this Italian case—be considered less important than interference 
with mental privacy. 
Altogether then, we find that covertness is sometimes considered a factor of 
importance when assessing location tracking’s privacy-intrusiveness. However, in 
many cases, it does not seem to play a significant role. 
8. Active Generation of Data 
A final factor, absent in Dutch law but prominent particularly in the United 
States, is whether police passively acquire or receive data that is generated anyway 
(particularly by those under investigation) or cause data to be generated at their own 
initiative. The latter is considered more intrusive, while the former is generally 
 
347. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, No. 3 at 70 (Neth.) (stating that the “description of 
observation does not include that the observation is covert” and that “[s]ystematic forms of non-covert 
observation are also covered by the description, although in practice these have limited meaning”). 
348. As defined in Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(9)(a) (UK), 
surveillance is covert “if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons 
who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.” 
349. See OPALINSKI, ROGALSKI & SZUSTAKIEWICZ, supra note 57. 
350. II Ka 267/13 District Court Suwałki, 19 December 2013 (Pol.). 
351. ERCOLE APRILE & FILIPPO SPIEZIA, LE INTERCETTAZIONI TELEFONICHE ED 
AMBIENTALI 158–59 (2004); CLAUDIO MARINELLI, INTERCETTAZIONI PROCESSUALI E NUOVI 
MEZZI DI RICERCA DELLA PROVA 240–41 (2004); TABASCO, supra note 96, at 166. 
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considered not or less intrusive because of the third-party doctrine, as was most 
visible in the regulation of cell-site location information in the lead up to Carpenter 
(although, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court held that the third-party doctrine did 
not apply to the CSLI at issue in that case).352 
When law enforcement itself initiates the generation of cell-phone metadata 
(such as with a GPS ping or by dialing the subject’s cell-phone), the rationale behind 
the third-party doctrine would not seem to apply, making the privacy intrusion 
larger than when acquiring data generated by subjects themselves.353 Somewhat 
more complicated is the issue of prospective CSLI, which is considered by some 
U.S. courts (but not by others) to be more intrusive than historical CSLI.354 In this 
line of thinking, an order for prospective data ensures that police will acquire all 
location data generated in the period following the order, which otherwise might 
not have been stored by the provider, thus implying a more active role of law 
enforcement in the data’s existence. German law also treats prospective CSLI as 
somewhat more intrusive than historical CSLI, since it applies some additional 
requirements,355 but Dutch and Czech law treat both in the same way,356 suggesting 
they do not consider it relevant for the privacy assessment whether law enforcement 
actively ensures that future location data will be recorded. The distinction between 
passive registration and active generation of data is also applied in the German 
regulation of silent SMS,357 but not in the Dutch legal assessment of the same 
method,358 showing consistency in how these countries use the factor of active 
involvement in data generation in their assessments across different methods of 
location tracking. 
In the United States, this factor also plays a role in the assessment of Wi-Fi 
tracking: even if police use technology not in general public use (such as 
MoocherHunter software), identifying the location of someone using an open  
Wi-Fi router is not considered a Fourth Amendment search because the person 
voluntarily generates a signal that is broadcast into publicly accessible space outside 
his home.359 
 
352. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Carpenter v. United States,  
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel 
circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is 
held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
353. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 510 (referring to United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 
U.S. 1050 (2005), which determined that the third-party doctrine does not apply if police dial the 
subject’s cell phone to generate CSLI). 
354. See supra note 209. 
355. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra notes 196, 199 and accompanying text. 
357. See supra note 223. 
358. See HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1569 (Neth.). 
359. See supra notes 292–93. 
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B. How is Privacy Framed? 
The previous section showed that many factors can play a role in an 
assessment of the privacy intrusion of police tracking. There is considerable 
variation, not only among but also within jurisdictions. Which combination of 
factors is looked at, and how these are weighed, also depends considerably on the 
context of the tracking method and how it is applied. Within this large variation, 
however, it is possible to discern some patterns by looking at the underlying privacy 
interests at issue. Courts and lawmakers evaluate police tracking’s intrusiveness 
from certain normative perspectives, associated with the privacy concern(s) that 
they perceive to be at stake. These perspectives function as “frames,” that is, 
windows on the world through which a problem is looked at. Framing plays an 
important role in defining problems in social policy, and the way a problem is 
defined—the window through which it is observed—influences the way it is or can 
be solved: frames have considerable impact on the solution space of a problem.360 
Looking at the frames applied by lawmakers and courts to regulate police tracking 
gives us insight into how existing conceptualizations of privacy, including classic 
privacy frames and informational self-determination, are applied in the context of 
new criminal investigation methods. And interestingly, we see that new privacy 
frames are being proposed and developed to regulate police tracking, which is 
indicative of regulators’ increasing discomfort with solutions that result from 
assessments relying on traditional privacy frames. 
1. Classic Privacy Frames 
Police tracking in its classic form—human tailing and observation—is usually 
restricted to publicly accessible places and, as it requires considerable time and 
effort, faces practical obstacles that commonly prevent it from being used very 
widely or intrusively. As a result, classic police tracking does not interfere with those 
aspects of the private sphere that are traditionally protected most strongly. 
However, with increasing technological capabilities allowing more intense forms of 
following people, police tracking may intrude more deeply into the private sphere. 
Indeed, we see that courts and lawmakers are particularly concerned with forms of 
police tracking that interfere with privacy types that are traditionally strongly 
protected, particularly by constitutional rights. In those cases, the following four 
classic privacy frames tend to be applied. 
a. Secrecy of Communications 
Since an important part of tracking people consists of tracking the movements 
of their cell-phones, the frame of communicational privacy is easily triggered. 
However, this frame is largely used by lawmakers and courts to argue why location 
 
360. Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in 
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137 (Andrew Ortony ed., 1993). 
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tracking is not particularly intrusive, since it only collects metadata, not the content 
of communications.361 While this argumentation is criticized in literature because it 
does not do justice to the intrusiveness of collecting locational metadata,362  
the emphasis on protecting communications content within the frame of 
communicational privacy still seems prevalent in most jurisdictions, which seems to 
foreclose arguments for strong privacy protection on the basis of cell-phones being 
tracked. We also see similar arguments with other forms of location tracking, such 
as GPS surveillance of cars, where the privacy-intrusiveness is argued to be lower 
than that of communications interception.363 Overall, then, the frame of 
communicational privacy tends to be applied to argue against the need for particular 
safeguards against location tracking, suggesting a general prioritization of 
communicational privacy over the behavioral privacy that is associated with people’s 
movements. 
b. Home 
As we observed, place is an important factor in normative assessments of 
location tracking364 because the frame of spatial privacy features one of the 
traditionally strongest forms of privacy protection, the home. As Freiwald observed 
in the U.S. context, the “only affirmative constitutional analysis the appellate courts 
have ratified for determining reasonable expectations of privacy in location data, 
then, is based on the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment protects our privacy 
interests in the home and surrounding areas.”365 
Most jurisdictions put considerably stronger safeguards in place when 
surveillance consists of, or has a likelihood of, tracking someone or something 
inside the home. For instance, Poland and Czechia apply stricter conditions when 
people are observed or followed in non-public places, as does the U.K. for 
residential premises and Germany for (also very short) observations in the home.366 
Dutch law even prohibits visual observation inside the home altogether;367 however, 
this prohibition is limited to making visual recordings inside the home, so that location 
tracking inside the home seems simply allowed. 
With technological forms of location tracking at a distance, it is not always 
clear whether or when this will involve following someone into private spaces. 
Courts in several jurisdictions argue that (ex post) an operation involved in-home 
tracking or (ex ante) an operation has considerable likelihood (particularly given a 
certain duration of tracking) of involving in-home tracking. This argument is 
 
361. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
362. See supra notes 184–85. 
363. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
364. See supra Section III.A.2. 
365. Freiwald, supra note 194, at 907. 
366. See supra notes 29, 81–82 and accompanying text. 
367. See supra note 99. 
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particularly used in relation to cell-phone tracking,368 but we also encounter it in 
GPS tracking cases.369 
Where the law does not impose specific safeguards on location tracking, it is 
frequently criticized in literature from the perspective of home protection. Italian 
authors argue that acquiring cell-phone location data interferes with the inviolability 
of the home370 and that GPS tracking of cars is insufficiently regulated, because cars 
can be parked in an area belonging to protected space (as part of curtilage or private 
yards).371 
c. Body 
In some countries, tracking items worn on or close to the body is considered 
more privacy-intrusive than tracking other items; the Netherlands considers it so 
privacy-intrusive as to prohibit it altogether.372 The frame of bodily integrity will be 
triggered more easily in jurisdictions that have specific constitutional protection  
for privacy of the body, as is the case in the Netherlands.373 However, other 
jurisdictions we studied have constitutional protection of (the body of) the person 
in some form,374 and one may wonder why, for instance, Germany does not apply 
stricter safeguards for tracking body-worn devices, given its constitutional right to 
physical integrity.375 Possibly, this is because observation for longer than twenty-
four hours is already strictly regulated in Germany,376 and the effort and risk of 
 
368. See, e.g., supra notes 212–13, 255 and accompanying text; see also Rothstein, supra note 193, 
at 528–29 (observing that the “home is sacrosanct in Fourth Amendment law: all details of the home 
are intimate details. . . . Precise cell phone tracking, like a beeper, reveals critical facts about the home’s 
interior.” (references omitted)). 
369. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred at the moment agents tracked a beeper-equipped can after it entered a 
private residence, as this allowed the Government “to surreptitiously [employ] an electronic device to 
obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the 
house”). 
370. Dinacci, supra note 185, at 371 (arguing that “it appears indisputable that the possibility to 
‘trace’ the presence of persons in the home of a subject through acquiring traffic data is equivalent to 
rendering ‘visible’ that which the rights-holder intended to remain confidential”); id. at 392 (finding 
that acquiring location data through a cell phone traffic data production order infringes the inviolability 
of the home, and that the current regulation is not in line with the constitutional requirements). 
371. Bene, supra note 42, at 361 (arguing that in GPS tracking “for longer periods . . . the risk is 
more concrete that the subject will park also in places of private abode”); see also MARINELLI, supra note 
94, at 256–57. 
372. See supra Section II.B.3. 
373. GW. [Constitution] art. 11 (Neth.). 
374. See Koops et al., supra note 17, at 529–31 (surveying constitutional protections of the (body 
of the) person). 
375. GRUNDGESETZ [G] [BASIC LAW] , art. 2(2) (Ger.) (translation at Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ,  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/7UDD-5HCP] ( last 
visited Feb. 3, 2019)). 
376. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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detection inherent in planting a tracker on body-worn devices will be too high for 
only short periods of tracking. 
d. Property 
While bodily integrity is a key privacy frame in the Dutch context, the 
protection of property and proprietary privacy form an important frame in the 
common-law context,377 most visibly in the United States. Significantly, the majority 
opinion in Jones resolved the privacy issues raised by GPS tracking by resorting to 
the frame of property rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy test;378  
a similar property interest emerges in the U.K.’s regulation of GPS tracking.379 This 
focus on property interests, rather than reasonable expectations of privacy, was 
subjected to criticism by the concurring justices, and has also been characterized as 
ill-suited for non-trespassory forms of location tracking that are now (increasingly) 
prevalent in modern society.380 Occasionally, the property frame may also be useful 
in civil-law systems to discuss the privacy interests raised by breaking into a car in 
order to place a tracking device.381 
2. The Informational Privacy Frame 
Informational privacy is, fifty years after Westin and the landmark German 
decision on informational self-determination,382 also a classic privacy frame, but we 
discuss it separately from the previous ones since it is a transversal frame, cutting 
across all primary types of privacy.383 While location tracking is frequently discussed 
within the frame of the privacy of communications, home, or body, we also 
encounter arguments that connect these, and other aspects of private life, into a 
narrative that emphasizes the information that can be derived from tracking 
someone’s movements. This informational frame is applied more by doctrinal 
scholars than by courts or lawmakers. 
 
377. See Koops et al., supra note 17 at 516–18 (surveying constitutional protections of property). 
378. See supra note 66. 
379. See supra note 125. 
380. See, e.g., Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial 
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 332–
33 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s most recent opinion in United States v. Jones, where the Court expanded its 
definition of a search, fails to keep current with technology.”); David Gray, A Collective Right to Be 
Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189, 195 (2015) (“[A]s Justice Sotomayor 
points out in Jones, we do not yet have constitutional principles capable of addressing, much less limiting, 
[many forms of contemporary] surveillance . . . .”). 
381. See supra text accompanying notes 297–301 (the Dutch discussion on the flock fiber 
method); cf. supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (the Italian discussion whether a car’s inside is 
a protected space), but that discussion fits more in a home frame than a property frame. 
382. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 280/66, Oct. 13, 1971 (Ger.) (identifying a right to informational self-
determination); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as the claim to 
determine when, how, and to what extent information about people is communicated to others). 
383.  Koops et al., supra note 17 at 568–69. 
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For instance, Wagnerová et al. argue that the Czech constitutional protection 
of private life (Article 10 Charter), and its element of informational self-
determination, includes the right to protection from surveillance (being watched or 
followed in public spaces), especially by public authorities; nevertheless, such 
powers of the state are not altogether excluded.384 In Italy, authors criticize the 
Supreme Court’s limiting of its evaluation of GPS tracking to the inviolability of the 
home, arguing that other fundamental rights are also at stake. Moreover, since the 
production order for traffic data (which includes location data) has safeguards to 
protect personal data, similar safeguards should apply to GPS tracking; in particular, 
a motivated order by the public prosecutor.385 Rothstein argues that “precise 
persistent cell phone tracking reveals private facts” and points out that the “private 
facts” model is often used to evaluate new forms of electronic surveillance,386 thus 
emphasizing the usefulness of informational privacy as a frame for assessing 
location tracking. Similarly, Buruma argues that when the Dutch list of factors 
relevant for judging the “systematicness” of tracking does not point to a clear 
outcome, the courts could particularly look at “whether data are collected on ‘certain 
privileged domains of life.’”387 
While informational privacy is thus frequently used in literature to argue that 
location tracking is, or can be, considerably intrusive, courts, in contrast, tend to use 
the frame to argue that certain instances of location tracking are not particularly 
intrusive. The European Court of Human Rights in Uzun, for instance, observed 
that “GPS surveillance is by its very nature to be distinguished from other methods 
of visual or acoustical surveillance which . . . as a rule . . . disclose more information 
on a person’s conduct, opinions or feelings.”388 The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Wise, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Knotts, found that the information obtained 
through using a tracking beeper “merely assisted the police to gather evidence 
which, to a great extent, they had [or could have] obtained by visually observing the 
vehicle.”389 Similarly, the Dutch Supreme Court allowed location tracking with an 
IMSI catcher on the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012, partly because of 
the fact that it only reveals the phone’s (or user’s) location but not what the user 
does or says.390 
While the latter argument may be correct in and of itself—knowing where 
someone is does not imply that you know what they are doing there—there are, of 
course, certain correlations between places and behavior. In a few cases, we see 
courts recognizing that inferences about private life can be drawn from location 
 
384. E. WAGNEROVÁ, I. POSPÍŠIL, T. LANGÁŠEK & V. ŠIMÍČEK, LISTINA ZÁKLADNÍCH PRÁV 
A SVOBOD, KOMENTÁŘ 285 (2012). 
385. GIUSEPPE TABASCO, PROVE NON DISCIPLINATE DALLA LEGGE NEL PROCESSO PENALE 
166–67 (2011); see also Bene, supra note 42, at 366–67; Marinelli, supra note 94, at 257. 
386. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 528. 
387. Buruma, supra note 48, at 658. 
388. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18. 
389. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 543 (Can.). 
390. See HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1562 (Neth.). 
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data and that these inferences may even reveal insight into intimate parts of life. 
When assessing the gravity of the encroachment connected with an investigation 
measure, the German Constitutional Court considers 
the processed data’s relevance to personality [to be] of special significance. 
A measure is considered highly invasive in particular when the relevant 
data allow conclusions about the nature and intensity of interpersonal 
relationships, personal interests, habits and tendencies, or the content of 
communication.391 
Now, because of the increasing digitization of telecommunication, traffic data 
reveal an ever-clearer picture of communication partners, which implies that 
increasingly, “communication data allow conclusions to be drawn about their 
personality, and even the generation of a personality profile becomes a real 
possibility.”392 The intimate nature of inferences possibly drawn from location data 
has been most forcefully expounded by the Maynard court: location data may reveal 
whether someone “is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, 
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of 
particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, 
but all such facts.”393 
Such framing of location tracking is, however, as yet relatively rare among 
courts in the jurisdictions we studied. We are not aware, for instance, of Canadian 
courts having used similar arguments related to informational privacy in location-
tracking cases (except insofar as Justice La Forest recognized the future potential of 
pervasive tracking in his dissent in Wise), even though Canadian law strongly 
protects “a biographical core of personal information [including] information which 
tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual.”394 Apparently, courts in Canada, and jurisdictions other than Germany 
and the United States, have not yet felt the need to draw on the insight that location 
data collected over a period of time can precisely reveal such intimate details of 
lifestyle and personal choices that informed the Maynard court’s decision. 
 
391. Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515 (referring to BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 2007, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2464 
(2470), 2007 (Ger.) and BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
2006, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 976 (980), 2006 (Ger.)). 
392. Id. at 515–16 (referring to BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] 2006, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 976 (980), 2006 (Ger.)). 
393. See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 194, 214 and accompanying 
text for similar arguments by the New Jersey Supreme Court under state law and by a district judge who 
observed that continued tracking can reveal intimate details of a person’s life that entering someone’s 
home need not reveal. 
394. R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.). 
First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2019  10:14 AM 
2019] LOCATION TRACKING BY POLICE 691 
3. New Privacy Frames 
a. Freedom of Movement, Anonymity, and a Right Not to Be Localized 
While informational privacy provides a useful frame for assessing the 
intrusiveness of location tracking, as it enables looking at the information about 
persons that can be derived from their movements, it may not be the only relevant 
frame to do so. In our research, we encountered another novel frame that connects 
informational privacy with what might be considered the main underlying privacy 
interest in location tracking, the behavioral privacy that is connected to the freedom 
of movement. This frame has been adopted by Italian authors, who argue that 
location tracking affects the liberty of movement, which is safeguarded by Italy’s 
Constitution.395 Tabasco observes that “if the liberty to circulate be understood as 
liberty to move freely without being spied on by mechanical instruments that do 
not allow the person to be aware of being ‘followed,’ it is evident that the activity 
of GPS tracking, inherent to the localization of an individual, infringes such an 
inviolable right.”396 Therefore, a “right not to be localized” should exist as a new 
component of the liberty of movement.397 
Such a right can be connected to the right to anonymity, which is relevant in 
public space. Commenting on a 2010 GPS tracking judgment, Gentile observes that 
in today’s society, people expose considerable parts of their life in social interactions 
outside of the home: 
This undeniable observation can, however, not legitimate any form of 
intrusion into the private sphere that could engender in the individuals the 
sensation of being continuously the object of control, generating doubtless 
prejudicial effects that evoke the so-called panopticon effect, inhibiting the 
human mind at the moment where it develops the obsession of constantly 
being under control.398 
In this context, the right to anonymity (diritto all’anonimato) has emerged in 
Italy. This right protects people from undue and prolonged intrusions into the 
private individual sphere and also when they voluntarily act in public places.399 The 
right to anonymity is recognized in Italy as part of the inviolable rights of the person, 
protected by Article 2 of the Constitution, and protects “situations and personal 
 
395. Art. 16 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Every citizen can circulate and stay freely in any part of 
the national territory, subject to limitations established by law in general for reasons of health or security. 
No restriction can be determined by political reasons.”). 
396. Tabasco, supra note 96, at 166. 
397. Id. (referring to A. Camon, L’acquisizione dei dati sul traffico delle comunicazioni, 47 RIVISTA 
ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE 594, 633 (2005)); see also Bene, supra note 124, at 348 
(asking whether GPS tracking infringes article 16 Constitution, understood also as a “right not to be 
localized”). 
398. Gentile, supra note 144, at 1472. 
399. Id. at 1473. 
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and family events from public curiosity and knowledge.”400 It is part of the “doctrine 
of privacy, understood in a new and more advanced form,” which helps to safeguard 
other fundamental liberties (and ultimately individual self-determination). This, 
Gentile concludes, can point the way to a legislative intervention with detailed 
norms for GPS tracking.401 
The frame of free movement, anonymity, and a right not to be localized is, so 
far, not widely applied outside of Italian scholarship. However, it sometimes pops 
up in other jurisdictions too, for instance in the U.S. context, where William Herbert 
has—somewhat provocatively—argued that location monitoring and control 
“constitutes a vestige and incident of slavery,” implying that the Thirteenth 
Amendment might apply to location tracking.402 This amendment grants Congress 
“the power to enact legislation targeted at eliminating those badges and incidents of 
slavery including the ‘privilege to go and come’ as one pleases.”403 Therefore, a law 
could be enacted “to ban the use of tracking devices to dominate and control the 
location of others.”404 
Another example is a report by the Dutch Rathenau Instituut, which advises 
Parliament on technology matters. In a report for the Council of Europe on 
robotics, artificial intelligence, and augmented reality, it observes that pervasive 
tracking and tracing has the accumulative effect of a “gradual but steady dissolving 
of privacy and anonymity for the individual.”405 However, people cannot be 
supposed to simply turn off their mobile devices if they do not want to be tracked 
or traced. Rather, lawmakers should recognize that in this context, the right to 
remain anonymous and/or the right to be let alone are at stake, “which in the robot 
age could be phrased as the right to not be electronically measured, analysed or 
coached.”406 Therefore, the Rathenau Instituut recommends that the Council of 
Europe “clarify to what extent in the context of the robot age the right to respect 
for privacy implies the right to not be measured, analysed or coached.”407 The 
argument that people should not be forced to turn off their mobile devices if they 
do not want to be tracked or traced is echoed in the Carpenter judgment, where the 
court argued that “[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been 
tailed every moment of every day for five years. . . . Only the few without cell 
 
400. Racc. uff. corte cost., 12 aprile 1973, n. 38, (It.) (quoted in Bene supra note 124, at 362). 
Both Gentile and Bene refer to Gabriella Di Paolo, Acquisizione dinamica dei dati relativi all’ubicazione 
del cellulare ed altre forme di localizzazione tecnologicamente assistita. riflessioni a margine dell’esperienza 
statunitense, CASSAZIONE PENALE 1219 (2008), who suggested applying the right to anonymity to 
develop regulation of location tracking. 
401. Gentile, supra note 144, at 1473. 
402. Herbert, supra note 11, at 429. 
403. Id. at 428 (referring to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 U.S. 409, 430 (1968)). 
404. Id. at 429. 
405. RATHENAU INSTITUUT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ROBOT AGE 43 (2017), 
https://www.rathenau.nl/en/digitale-samenleving/human-rights-robot-age. 
406. Id. at 44. 
407. Id. 
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phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”408 From that 
perspective, these limitations on law enforcement agencies’ ability to access 
historical CSLI might be interpreted (although not phrased as such in the judgment) 
as expressing the idea that people ought to have a reasonable claim or ability to not 
be localized. 
Thus, while the privacy interest in anonymity and freedom of movement is 
not yet widely recognized as relevant for assessing location tracking, we think it may 
become a more prevalent and productive frame in the future, as pervasive location 
tracking (not only by police, but also by other public and private actors) may be 
increasingly felt to stifle people’s sense that they can freely move around in public 
space without an inhibitory or panoptic effect of feeling followed. 
b. Mosaic Theory 
A more broadly applied new frame is that of the privacy interest consisting in 
the cumulative picture, or mosaic, of disparate pieces of information. Single stones 
say very little, but put together, a mosaic of many small stones can be quite revealing 
of someone’s private life. As the Maynard court expressed, “the whole of one’s 
movements . . . reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of 
its parts.”409 Here, the judge borrowed from case law related to exemptions to 
disclosure under the Federal Freedom of Information Act for national security 
purposes: “What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment 
to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of 
information in its proper context.”410 
This reasoning, which is generally referred to as the mosaic theory (endorsed 
by both concurring opinions in Jones411 and built upon in Carpenter),412 has yet to 
gain a firm foothold in U.S. case law. Although it is welcomed by several scholars 
 
408. See supra note 190. 
409. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
410. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (as quoted in id. at 562 (internal citations omitted)). 
The mosaic theory resembles some principles from moral philosophy. Parfit points out five mistakes 
in moral mathematics, which include ignoring the effects of sets of acts and ignoring small or 
imperceptible effects. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70–78 (1984). He claims that 
“[e]ven if an act harms no one, this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm 
other people.” Id. at 70 (italics in original). 
411. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 
428–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
412. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (referring to information that 
was “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” (emphasis added)); id. at 2217 (referring to “an 
all-encompassing record” (emphasis added)) (discussing where the metaphors of encyclopedias and all-
encompassing records echo the mosaic theory’s metaphor of a comprehensive image made up of small 
items); see also supra notes 179, 187 and accompanying text. 
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as an important new perspective on privacy protection in the context of law 
enforcement,413 it is also criticized for vagueness and lack of normative guidance.414 
Still, it seems significant that similar reasoning is applied in several of our 
jurisdictions. Although not labeled in terms of the mosaic theory, and phrased in 
less vivid terms than in Maynard, the argumentation in various location-tracking 
cases demonstrates mosaic argumentation. For instance, the German 
Bundesgerichtshof highlighted that GPS tracking technology should be considered 
together with other measures: “If the application of ‘GPS’ goes along with other 
interventions, each being in itself permissible, and if this leads to a comprehensive 
surveillance of the person, then this can violate the proportionality principle.”415 In 
effect, Germany prohibits “total surveillance” (Totalüberwachung) or “all around 
surveillance” (Rundumüberwachung) that would lead to a comprehensive personality 
profile of someone. This is ensured, according to the Constitutional Court, by the 
general procedural guarantees of subsidiarity and proportionality, which imply that 
the cumulative effect of different investigation activities needs to be taken into 
account.416 The “personality profile” can be seen as a mosaic picture that reveals 
the core of someone’s private life.417 The German safeguards against “total 
surveillance” resonate in the U.S. Supreme Court’s warrant requirement for the 
collection of historical CSLI in view of its character as “tireless and absolute 
surveillance.”418 
 
413. See, e.g., Lance H. Selva, William L. Shulman & Robert B. Rumsey, Rise of the Mosaic Theory: 
Implications for Cell Site Location Tracking by Law Enforcement, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & 
PRIVACY L. 235 (2016) (“[T]he mosaic theory provides the most compelling approach to addressing 
the challenge . . . to interpret and apply Fourth Amendment principles as originally conceived by the 
Framers to ever-evolving technologies of surveillance.”); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of 
United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2012); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic 
Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach,  
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013) (outlining “an administrable” approach, informed in part 
by the mosaic theory); Rothstein, supra note 193 at 527 (defending the mosaic theory against Orin Kerr’s 
criticism). 
414. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 209–10 (2015) (finding that survey 
respondents, as proxies for the subjective expectations of privacy element of the Katz test, do not 
coincide with Justice Alito’s arguments in favor of the mosaic theory—particularly the claim that 
duration of tracking impacts perceived intrusiveness); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered 
Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy,  
14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 402–11 (2013) (raising a number of criticisms of the impact of the mosaic 
theory on Fourth Amendment law); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,  
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) (“[A]s a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”). 
415. BGH Jan. 24, 2001, 3 StR 324/00, 27 (OLG Düsseldorf) (Ger.). 
416. BVerfG, Az. 2 BvR 581/01, Apr. 12, 2005 (Ger.). 
417. Cf. Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515–16 (“The quantity and the substance of  
accruing traffic data serve to paint an ever clearer picture of communication participants. Increasingly, 
communication data allow conclusions to be drawn about their personality, and even the generation of 
a personality profile becomes a real possibility.” (italics added)). 
418. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018). 
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The mosaic metaphor is also visible in the main Dutch frame used to assess 
the intrusiveness of location tracking: an investigation operation is considered 
“systematic” if it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of certain 
aspects of someone’s [private] life.”419 The Polish District Court in Suwałki also 
applied mosaic argumentation, where it reasoned that collecting individual bits of 
information that reveal no significant conclusions about someone is to be 
distinguished from the systematic collection of location data for a longer time, 
which reveals far more about the person.420 
Thus, in GPS-tracking cases, U.S. courts—as well as courts in Germany,  
the Netherlands, and Poland—have applied the main principle of the mosaic theory, 
namely that the intrusiveness of a measure should not be judged (only) on the basis 
of the collection of discrete pieces of information, each of which may reveal little, 
but (also) on the basis of the cumulative picture emerging from the combination of 
all these pieces. This is a telltale sign that the traditional privacy frames through 
which location tracking would normally be assessed, fall short when it comes to 
tracking persons in public space: apparently, the frame of the home—with its 
implication that acts in public can be freely observed—does not offer satisfactory 
solutions, and courts therefore reframe the problem in different terms. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the mosaic theory offers concrete 
guidance to assess the intrusiveness of different forms of location tracking. Yet even 
if the mosaic theory, in its current embryonic stage of development, lacks a concrete 
yardstick to judge when the combination of stones is revealing enough to constitute 
a mosaic, it has added value. This is because in framing the problem of location 
tracking in terms of accumulated data, it invites looking for solutions that are better 
suited to contemporary society than the answers offered by the old frame of the 
public space/private space distinction. In other words, even if the mosaic theory 
does not provide ready answers, by asking how much information police may gather 
about someone’s private life by tracking their movements, it at least asks a more 
pertinent question than the old question of whether someone has willingly exposed 
themselves to being visible in public. 
CONCLUSION 
The answer to the question “Where have you been?” can be very telling, not 
only revealing factual information about your exact whereabouts at certain points 
in time, but also suggestive of your habits and preferences, and ultimately, if 
sufficient location information is available, of most of your private life. Location 
tracking may be age-old, but never has technology afforded so much insight into 
people’s personal life as contemporary tracking technologies do. The privacy 
interest in location information is therefore profound. Is this profound interest 
recognized in current legal assessment on the intrusiveness of location tracking? 
 
419. See supra note 102 (emphasis added). 
420. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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As this Article shows, there is great variety in technologies and forms of 
location tracking, and the intrusiveness of location tracking varies accordingly to a 
substantial extent. Not only does the intrusiveness differ depending on the method 
and technology, it also depends considerably on the way in which the technology is 
applied in concrete cases. This implies that, although some general assessment of a 
tracking method’s intrusiveness is possible (ALPR monitoring of cars is generally 
less intrusive than GPS tracking of body-worn devices), a fine-grained analysis of 
how particular tracking technologies afford more or less intrusive insight into 
people’s movements and behavior, depending on how they are used, is required. 
Altogether, this requires a highly context-dependent, and thus case-specific, 
assessment, in which a number of factors (such as use of particular technical devices; 
covertness; place, intensity, duration, and object of monitoring; and whether police 
actively generate or passively receive location data) must be taken into account, none 
of which is necessary or sufficient in itself. 
At a deeper level of analysis, it turns out that it is not only the case that various 
factors play a role in intrusiveness assessments; the way in which the privacy interest 
in location tracking is framed is also relevant. When confronted with new forms of 
location tracking, lawmakers and courts—understandably—initially resort to 
existing privacy frames, that is, the well-established types of privacy that have been 
firmly established as protection-worthy in legal systems: communications privacy, 
the spatial privacy of the home, and bodily privacy, as well as informational privacy. 
Viewed through these frames, location tracking usually does not appear particularly 
intrusive. Framing the question as “To what extent does location tracking infringe 
the privacy of communications, home, or body?” invites a prima facie answer, “not 
very much.” The classic frames of communicational privacy and spatial privacy tend 
to be applied to argue against the need for particular safeguards against location 
tracking, suggesting a general prioritization of communicational and spatial privacy 
over the behavioral privacy that is associated with people’s movements. Similarly, 
from an informational privacy perspective, location tracking need not at first sight 
be very privacy-sensitive since location coordinates reveal where you have been, but 
not what you have done or said there. This implies that if the question of location 
tracking’s intrusiveness is formulated on the basis of traditional privacy frames, the 
answer tends to be biased towards downplaying the privacy infringement of location 
tracking. 
As our analysis shows, there is increasing discomfort with the answers thus 
yielded by the traditional privacy frames. While lawmakers and courts still do resort 
to these frames, arguing, for example, that GPS tracking is not very intrusive 
because it is largely limited to public space and that cell-phone tracking does not 
reveal communications content, scholars (and to some extent, lawmakers and 
courts) have started to resort to other frames. This shift reflects an increasing 
recognition that people’s locations are strongly correlated to their habits and 
preferences, and that what people do can reveal as much about their inner life as 
what they say. But this is, of course, not always the case: it is hard to find objective, 
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a priori criteria for when behavior can be as revealing as someone’s utterances or 
the details of their domestic life. This perhaps explains the intuitive appeal of the 
mosaic theory, which is the main novel-privacy frame to emerge from contemporary 
location-tracking cases. The mosaic theory functions as an important normative 
addition to the frame of informational privacy by focusing attention on the 
accumulation of information: the picture emerging from putting together discrete 
pieces of information is more revealing than the sum of its parts. The combination 
of the informational-privacy frame and the mosaic theory seems well-suited  
to assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, since it eminently enables a  
context- and case-specific assessment. Its strength may also be its weakness, since 
its broad applicability in all cases does not provide a concrete yardstick to measure 
when a collection of stones, put together, constitutes a mosaic. Yet we think that it 
has added value over traditional privacy frames since, even if it does not give ready 
answers, it asks a more pertinent question than those raised within traditional frames 
of communicational, spatial, and bodily privacy. 
The mosaic theory, which is as yet in a rather embryonic stage of 
conceptualization, should be further developed, as it may assist in regulating twenty-
first-century criminal investigation methods that challenge privacy in ways that are 
hard to address with twentieth-century legal frameworks. Its potential obviously 
stretches beyond location tracking, since its abstract character may well be applied 
to all forms of criminal investigation (and, indeed, to the combination of different 
methods). However, because of its abstractness, the mosaic theory may also turn 
out to lack normative thrust, at least when it comes to guiding the regulation of 
specific forms of location tracking. There may be merit, therefore, in also 
considering the other novel frame emerging from our analysis: the freedom of 
movement, or the interest in moving around in publicly accessible places in relative 
anonymity, without (the feeling of) being continuously monitored. This frame is 
specifically suited to assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, as it connects the 
informational content of location data to the underlying privacy interest, namely the 
behavioral privacy of moving around in public space without the inhibitory or 
panoptic effect of feeling followed. Since quite a few relatively new methods of 
location tracking, such as real-time cell-phone location tracking, stealth SMS, and 
IMSI catchers, are now being introduced (or are starting to be applied more broadly) 
by police in many countries, there is a window of opportunity for lawmakers and 
courts to consider adopting the frame of anonymity and freedom of movement to 
assess the intrusiveness of location tracking. 
Overall, we conclude that the analysis in this Article demonstrates that legal 
privacy frameworks developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are not 
well-suited for assessing the privacy-intrusiveness of contemporary location-
tracking investigation methods, particularly since location tracking can have 
characteristics of “tireless and absolute surveillance.” The emergence of novel 
frameworks for understanding and protecting privacy opens up new pathways for 
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lawmakers and courts to address the challenge of preserving privacy in the twenty-
first century. 
 
